Assad, a monster, has won. He has a firm grasp on all major cities and ports: Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Tartus. He has enough control of even the most restive regions, the Daraa and Sweida Governates, to ensure his survival. His lack of control near the Turkish border is a mere annoyance.
No military force poses any
threat to him, not least because no regional or international power has any desire
to unseat him. He knows that he has
nothing to fear from the US and its subservient ‘allies’. For one thing, they want him in power because
they fear Islamists would replace him. For
another, were there the will to unseat him, there isn’t the way. The West has the military means to crush him,
but those means are unusable for domestic political reasons. To unseat him and destroy the régime
would require a long-term commitment of hundreds of thousands of ground troops. No Western government would dare to propose
any such thing to their electorates.
Assad and the whole world
know this. They saw US ‘coalitions’
first effectively deliver Iraq to Iranian proxies, and then suffer humiliating
expulsion from Afghanistan. Clawing back
his territory inch by inch, Assad has never wavered in his determination to
repel forces that once occupied districts of
greater Damascus.
The few who predicted this,
two or three years after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, were condemned
as blinded by cynical prejudice. But
they were right. The defeat is no less real
for all the objections raised by those in denial. It does not matter that the country is in
ruins: so were some victorious nations in 1918 or 1945. It does not matter if Assad exists at the
good pleasure of Russia, Iran and, if the truth be told, the US and Israel. It does not matter that, given the support or
connivance of these external powers, it was never a fair fight. It does not matter that, in the minds of some
powerless expats, ‘the struggle continues’. The reality is that Assad has obtained his
objectives, and the rebels have not, nor have they any prospect of attaining
theirs. None of this is likely to
change, unless it be in Assad's favour.
This is apparent in the current push to normalize relations with his
régime.
In this grim situation, some
Assad opponents seem fully occupied with their outrage. They fail to address the most pressing
question: what can be done for Syrians,
not only those who live a miserable existence in fragile, imperfect refuge from
Assad's operations, but also those who must live fully within his grasp.
For those fully outside
Assad's reach, the answers are clear:
they are refugees. The ways to
help refugees are well-known. If there
is a big gap between knowing what should be done and seeing it is done, at
least there is no mystery about making progress towards the objectives. And some work tirelessly to achieve these
goals.
But what of those who must
live in areas under his control, or in areas where he still can inflict
atrocities on those he detests? These
amount to millions
of innocent people. And once the
realities of defeat are taken into account, their prospects are even worse,
much worse, than normally supposed.
That's because Assad and his régime will almost certainly continue to
commit atrocities well into the foreseeable future. Since he has won, why wouldn’t he? There will be thousands more victims, perhaps
some yet unborn.
Picture a determined
opponent of the Syrian régime, looking for a course of action with some chance
of putting an end to this catastrophe – to overthrow Assad. It is hard to imagine anyone coming up with a
winning strategy today. Assad’s
opponents must now operate from a position of weakness. Winning strategies would therefore have to
come from a close watch on current realities, and a search for whatever
opportunities the future may hold.
Unfortunately most of what
we hear today about Syria has nothing to do with some future attempt to
overthrow Assad. It isn’t even aimed at helping
Syrians living under his rule. Instead of
strategic thinking, we hear moralizing, dreams of vengeance and other varieties
of wishful thinking, all wrapped up in talk of justice. But it is just talk. It has little to do with justice in any
real-world sense. It has little to do
with even an intention to alleviate the suffering or restore the rights
of the Syrian people.
Western media have - The New
York Times, The Washington Post, the Guardian, and more centrist outlets like
CNN - have been sympathetic to the Syrian revolution since its outbreak in
2011. But this support has a particular
slant. There have been admiring
portrayals of the democratic Syrian opposition - the Westernized,
secular or liberal Muslim activists and politicians, the artists, the writers,
overwhelmingly non-military figures.
There have been respectful accounts of brave journalists who bring back
the news from these unthreatening sectors of the opposition. There is much investigative work, documenting
Assad’s atrocities and arguing, at great length, with those seeking to deflect
guilt from the régime. In defeat, these
investigations tend to turn away from the present and towards the past. Opposition has become, more and more, a
matter of analysis and indignant commentary.
These efforts must at some
point have had a role in the condemnations issued by important Western
institutions – in official government statements, legislated sanctions like the
American Caesar act, international arrest warrants, and the degradation of
diplomatic relations with the Syrian régime.
These developments are sometimes described as victories, triumphs. Indeed you can find defenses of Assad only in
the ever-insignificant American left.
Yet Assad is no less a
victor for all these declarations, researches, loud condemnations and dramatic gestures. Not one of his captive subjects is any better
off or more protected by this incessant outpouring of cruelly empty
‘support’. Not one of them is helped by elegant
commentators offering acidic observations about Gulf State, Egyptian or
Jordanian, even Turkish cynicism. This
‘support’ has indeed produced some results – the sanctions, the international
indictments, the refusals to normalize. It’s
just that the results are valueless, as is the entire effort that produced
them.
This does not mean that
trying to help the Syrian people is hopeless.
It means that no one so much as contemplates the decisions that might
offer some hope. Instead, we have moralizers
pontificating as if they were victors.
They pretend to mistake Assad, a victorious sovereign, for a hunted
criminal. They scorn the prospect of
allies who do not espouse their high principles or standards of behaviour. This refusal to back Assad’s most dangerous
enemies helped him wreak his atrocities during his battles. It continues to do so.
It’s only when this moralistic
fantasizing is thoroughly discredited that it will become possible even to
think about stopping Assad. That means
grasping the futility of attempts to bring him to justice, or to cement his
isolation on the international stage.
What follows describes the absurdity pursuing these goals from a
position of defeat. Then it becomes
clear that any chance to weaken the Syrian régime has to involve its strongest regional
opponents – Turkey and the Islamist militias in Idlib – whatever their moral
failings.
I will examine first the
attempts to make the régime pay for its past atrocities, and then the measures
designed to weaken Assad.
Justice
The current campaigns for
justice aim address two horrors – Assad’s human rights violations and his war
crimes. The prospects of success in
these ventures are, at most, negligible.
Human rights violations
The nicely calibrated, meticulously
implemented version of justice popular among Assad’s Western opponents is
entirely incapable of making a dent in the criminality so deeply entrenched
within the Assadist régime.
Yes, a handful of incautious
régime emigrants and government officials are captured and and judged. This simply has no relationship to the scale or
character of the injustices supposedly being addressed.
The official Syrian Security
Services, responsible for most of the torture and murder, number around
120,000, not counting presumably thousands of informers, not counting the
secretive and fearsome Air Force Branch.
The unbridled viciousness of these forces is not some secret, recently
revealed by plucky investigators.
Indeed, Human Rights Watch issued a report
decrying the situation the year before the start of the Syrian uprising. Syria's security services were notorious at
least back to 1980, when Tadmor (Palmyra) prison became the scene of a
well-known massacre. For those with even
longer memories, there was the brutal terror of essentially the same régime in
the mid-1950s.
This brutality bore no
resemblance to the Nazis' intermittent efforts to conceal their crimes, much
less with any "I was only following orders" protests of the Nazi torturers
and their complicit bureaucrats. On the
contrary, the security services were happy to make their cruelty known. So here is a state of affairs where the
quasi-totality of 120,000 personnel were significantly involved, especially
according to the current norms about complicity in such crimes.
This ongoing horror has all
taken place within a régime that has beaten off the most determined
revolutionaries, and which learned from Obama that it has nothing to fear from
Western military intervention. Out of
120,000, a dozen or so security force criminals have been foolhardy enough to
get themselves brought to trial in Western Europe. The idea that this constitutes even a hint of
justice for the victims is absurd. The
idea that these arrests might be some harbinger of a deterrent effect is, well,
a descent into madness.
War crimes
The same impunity that
applies to Assad's torturers, also applies to his war crimes. It must not be thought that these were the
top-down strategies of a sophisticated military power, like the gas warfare of
World War I or the Allied bombings of Axis cities. The Syrian army is probably capable of
sophistication, but the war crimes it committed beginning in 2012 did not, for
the most part, have that character. In a
brilliant piece by Kheder
Khaddour, the Syrian army emerges as something like a corrupt bureaucracy, divided
into localized fiefs that react to threats with considerable flexibility and
autonomy. This has much to do with who
is responsible for the crimes that some, dreaming about justice, imagine
prosecuting.
The main crimes attributable
to these Syrian armed forces are massacres, poison gas attacks, and barrel
bombings.
The massacres have
been carried out by thugs belonging to roaming militias. These shabiha are sometimes
steroid-crazed monsters, slitting throats with huge garish knives or
perpetrating other atrocities. They
sometimes act in cooperation with Syrian army units, but not as Syrian army
members.
The gas attacks are
carried out by Syrian army members, or possibly allied forces with access to
Syrian army stockpiles. It is not clear
how high in the army command chain the plans have been initiated. What is clear is that the attacks were
not the project of a disciplined modern army.
The delivery systems were extremely crude improvised munitions (IRAMs),
rocket-assisted gas canisters, quite dangerous to the perpetrators. No modern army would use such weapons.
In terms of lives lost, air
attacks on hospitals, residential areas and breadlines were the worst. The breadlines, crucial to Syrians, were hit
with double-tap attacks, where a second munition was dropped once rescuers
showed up. Here again, most of the
attacks were nothing like the work of a modern army. They involved barrel bombs, improvised
munitions not much above the level of a pipe bomb, un-aimable and typically
dropped from helicopters. Once more, the
atrocities have the earmarks of disjointed, loosely directed, unsophisticated
military forces.
For the purposes of justice,
what matters here is that responsibility spreads throughout the Assadist forces
to an unusual extent. The issue is not
whether Assad himself is responsible. If
he had only %1 responsibility in all the slaughter and torture, it would more
than enough to merit the most severe punishments justice could impose. But the ragged, diffuse nature of the
atrocities means that, again to an unusual extent, a heavy burden of
responsibility is diffused throughout the hundreds of thousands that formed the
military resources of the Syrian régime.
Could Assadist outrages ever
meet with just retribution? The verdicts
of the Nuremberg trials, followed by decades of lesser prosecutions, imposed
penalties on only a fraction of those responsible for Nazi war crimes. But compared to what international tribunals
can deliver to Assadist criminals, the Nazi war crimes prosecutions would count
as a stunning success. The
decentralized, anarchic, undisciplined bunch - one could say, a population
of war criminals in Syria - will never show up before tribunals hundreds or
thousands of miles away. They will all
get away with it. Only a prolonged and
very determined military occupation would change that, and the prospect of such
an occupation simply doesn’t exist today.
In short, criminal
investigation and prosecution will do absolutely nothing to restore the rights
of the Syrian people - much less offer protection from brutal murder. The prosecutions of Assadist criminals will
reach a vanishingly small proportion of the culprits. And that means a level of justice approaching
zero. Though much is made of 'holding
Assad accountable', or anyone else accountable, this is an equivocation. It only means identifying a very, very
few of the culprits, who will go on to lead untroubled lives. It does not mean imposing appropriate
punishment on them. Talk of
accountability offers only the most fragile illusion of justice, not the
reality.
The whole enterprise of
research, documentation, investigation, analysis and prosecution of Assadist
crimes will, in short, do nothing at all for the Syrian people. It will not do anything to restore their
rights. It will not deter future
atrocities. It will not even bring some
vastly inadequate consolation to the tiny proportion of families who see their
persecutors condemned. But will anything
else help those suffering under the régime?
What about sanctions? What about
normalisation?
Sanctions
The appeal to sanctions must
be that, somehow, they will make things better for Syrians: sure, there will be some negative
consequences, but overall, the régime will bend, and comply with something
resembling minimal standards of decency.
Anyone believing this could hardly venture further into the depths of
denial.
Assad won his war under
sanctions, and Syria has been under sanctions since 1979. Some argue that sanctioning
Syria “hurts the people much more than the regime.”
It's hard to see how this
could be false, but suppose it is. Even
so, sanctions have failed to bring any substantial change anywhere, it
seems. No doubt the régime is hurt in
the sense that it doesn't get the latest and greatest technology, and its
backers have trouble getting desirable consumer goods, or doing business. But the régime doesn't need any of this to
continue its oppression or cement its rule.
No doubt sanctions give the régime less power to resist Western military
action, but it's precisely this action which Western nations are steadfastly
resolved to avoid.
This has been the net
result of sanctions everywhere. Here is
a specialist commenting on
the evasion of current sanctions against Russia.
“I don’t think there’s any secret what’s going
on,” said Gary Stanley, a trade compliance expert who advises businesses in
aerospace and other industries. “How long have we had Cuban sanctions? How long
have we had North Korean sanctions? How long have we had Iranian sanctions? It
never seems to put these folks out of business.”
It seems that demand for
sanctions, and the sanctions themselves, are best understood as an expression
of outrage. Promoting sanctions seems
unrelated to any expectations about making anything better for Syrians, or
indeed to any concern about making things worse. It complements the futile reliance on
internationally imposed justice.
Normalisation
Maybe the idea about
sanctions is not so much that they work, but that lifting them would be a sign
that we weren't outraged any more. Much
the same might hold with other aspects of normalisation.
Many reports have
focused, not on Westerners' outrage, but on the pain which many Syrians
experience to see Assad rehabilitated in the region. This focus gets us nowhere, because nothing
can be done to alleviate their pain. Indeed
much of the commentary from anti-Assad sources stresses the callousness of, for
example, the Gulf State rulers, who obviously care nothing for the suffering of
the Syrian people.
This isn’t news. No one, in the entire course of the Syrian
revolution, has ever suggested that those who came to promote normalisation
were anything but callous in the face of Syrians' agony. Where Syrian rights and Syrian well-being are
concerned, nothing has changed.
The only other question
has to do with the effects of normalisation.
One aggrieved
party says that "This weekend’s Arab League summit
will embolden the regime to continue its crimes, including the forced
disappearances of hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrians." The sentiments behind the claim deserve respect, but
the claim itself isn't plausible.
The Syrian régime has never,
at any point in seven decades, showed any hesitation to engage in its atrocious
practices. It has never shown the
slightest sensitivity to international indignation, or any response to stigmatization. It has at most offered some paper-thin
imitation of human decency when playing on the international stage. Nothing suggests even a remote chance that
external pressure would bring change for the better. Nothing suggests that normalisation will make
things worse, because the régime in its isolation already allowed itself the
full measure of horror.
Normalisation may bring some
changes. Perhaps it will expand imports
of Western consumer products. It might
boost the economy. It might mean that
some humanitarian aid gets though - to the Syrian government, which will know
how to turn that aid to its own advantage.
Syria might be stronger; this might help the Syrian people, or it might
make things even worse for those exposed to Assad's vengeance. Most likely, it is as with sanctions: on
balance lifting them will do no good, and not lifting them will do no
good. Normalisation won't help, and
withholding it won't help either.
Hopeless, but for whom?
In summary, for those who demand
nothing less than justice, there is no hope at all. And this would mean there is no hope at all
for the Syrian people. They will continue
to suffer at Assad’s good pleasure. This
could go on for years, even decades.
When the lives of so many
Syrians are under such atrocious and open-ended attack, it seems natural,
reasonable to suppose that what matters most are Syrian lives: saving them,
perhaps improving them, should count most in decisions affecting them. But for many Westerners, and some Westernized
Syrians, saving Syrian lives is by no means what matters most. What matters most is to make choices that
affirm various high principles, and reject choices that don’t. It is the mentality of someone who sees an
apartment block set ablaze by arsonists, hears the screams of the occupants,
but won’t call in the police and fire, because they’re dyed-in-the-wool Trump
supporters. Thus even the most vocal
refugee advocates didn’t offer so much as a murmur in support of Erdogan, whose
continued rule shields the lives of many Syrians outside Assad’s grasp.
This perverse fastidiousness
is most apparent in decisions about Syria itself. If the terrible state of Syrians represents
the problem, no one now can suppose that prosecutions or sanctions constitute
the solution. A solution, then, would
have to involve a full-scale, long-term military intervention, one that ends
the régime once and for all. But then
the problem becomes: who’s going to
intervene? Here is where every public analysis
of Syria’s agony simply freezes up, and has done so ever since it became
apparent that the pro-democracy, Westernized Syrian factions were not going to
enter Damascus in triumph.
Yet the prospects for
military intervention, were Western countries to support it, have got better,
not worse. Russia will certainly emerge
weaker from the Ukraine conflict, not stronger.
Just two years ago, the prospect of serious confrontation with Russia
made military action in Syria a non-starter, because it posed a tiny but still
unacceptable prospect of all-out world war.
Today, that prospect is tinier still, and seems acceptable to many
political actors - as the Ukraine conflict, again, has shown.
The trouble is that Western
reluctance to intervene in Syria has increased at a rate that far outpaces the
increasing ease of intervention. There are several reasons for this. The West’s
humiliation in Afghanistan makes another mission supremely unattractive
to Western publics. The discovery of
vast natural gas deposits in the Mediterranean makes Syria irrelevant to
Western concerns about energy supplies.
And the need to replenish Western armaments sent to Ukraine, combined
with concerns about China, make Western militaries ever more reluctant to take
on another large-scale burden.
But this does not mean that there
can be no hope for Syrians. It only
means that hope cannot rest on Western military intervention. It does raise the possibility that the West
would finally back a regional power, Turkey, in such a venture. This would mean military assistance to
Turkey, in quantity and quality, orders of magnitude greater than today. So armed, Turkey would be in a position to
end Assad's rule. To be clear, this
would require cooperation with some sector of the Syrian revolt. That means Syrian Islamists because, in the
words of one specialist,
As it stands, the most capable and powerful factions
which are able to launch an offensive against the Assad regime are the Islamist
rebel groups in north-western Syria.
For the West, backing Turkey
to the hilt is far, far cheaper than any of America’s recent wars. Turkey already has a large and capable
army. It would be happy to get the F-35s
it was promised, and could therefore achieve air superiority: the sticking
point was supposed to be its S-400 anti-aircraft system, yet there was no fuss about
Greece’s S-300. Strengthening Turkey,
which controls all access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, would also
strengthen an important counterweight to Russia in the region.
Even better, Turkish
intervention would allow the US to withdraw from Syria altogether. This might be a good idea, especially for
those appalled by Assad. In the
Northeast, the US backs the SDF, a front for
the PKK. The PKK is designated as a
terrorist organization by both the US and the EU. Much more important, the PKK/SDF and its
political counterpart the YPG are intermittent, discreet and fractious but
crucial allies of Assad: They have
played an important role in his
victories ever since 2012. They are also
proponents of the
normalisation so deplored when Arabs propose it. There is strong pro-Kurdish sentiment in
Europe, but there are other ways of satisfying it, for example by backing the
PKK rival, the KDP. Yet Western nations
affect bemusement when Turkey seems to object to NATO powers sheltering a
PKK-dominated force in northwest Syria, a branch of an organisation conducting
military operations within Turkey.
At the moment, this
possibility is not a live option.
Perhaps it will never be. The
main obstacle is that no one so much as suggests it. The reason is unclear.
What’s clear is that, in
Western eyes, Turkey, in the person of Erdogan, represents a kind of regional
Donald Trump. He is a ‘conservative’
Muslim, anything but LGBTQ-friendly. Even
after winning a “highly
competitive and consequential” election, he is a dictator. He consorts with Islamists, who fulfil the
role of something like the Proud Boys in the US. He is considered financially reckless and given
to grandiose projects. His wife is veiled, perhaps submissive? In short, his brand is terrible.
In contrast, his enemy the
PKK has a wonderful brand: the PKK is
secular, a brave underdog, and features strong, attractive female leaders and
fighters. This is not sarcasm: branding
really seems to be at the root of many commentators’ political choices, who
after all have no skin in the game. But
why the partisanship? No social or
sexual minorities will be better off because Western decision-makers dislike Erdogan
and Turkey. While deploring Trump might
have some effect on what actually happens in the US and even Europe, deploring
Erdogan will change nothing for Turkey’s minorities. Its only effect is to make
the most plausible route to helping Syrians unthinkable. It is as if the value-based decisions
affecting Syria are divorced from any consideration of cause and effect.
For there to be hope for
Syrians, there must at least be people whose desire to end Assad’s atrocities outweighs
their branding preferences and their pet causes. They would recognize that if there are no
good options, that’s not a cue to shake one’s head and walk out on Syrians’
agony. This shouldn’t even look like a hard
choice. Leaving the Syrians to their
awful fate is not going to produce some democratic, LGBTQ-friendly, feminist,
journalist-respecting state in either Turkey or Syria. Indeed it is hard to understand how hatred of
Erdogan and the Islamists must somehow transmute into useless indignation that might
as well be cruel indifference.
It would be disingenuous to
pretend that Turkish-Islamist intervention has no real drawbacks. It certainly would not satisfy all legitimate
Kurdish demands. There are impressive
analysts and commentators who would agree with my pessimistic arguments but
just shake their heads at the very idea of supporting an Erdogan initiative
linked to his most likely potential ally, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the
increasingly powerful Islamist leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). But what could these knowledgeable writers
suggest?
They could not, with a
straight face, pretend to expect Western powers to intervene, after
all this time and in this very tense world situation. They would have to weigh misery under Assad
against the possibility of something better under a Turkish-Islamist
administration. Jolani and Erdogan have
both taken pains to give the impression of moderation. Are they sincere? Even if they are, could they keep the
situation in hand? Would the Western or
regional powers cooperate in their efforts?
Could some solution placate the Russians and Iran? The answers are simple: we can’t possibly
know. The choice is between the absolute
certainty of unending disaster, for millions, and the distinct but lesser
possibility of some other type of disaster.
It would be irrational to prefer the former.