The human rights movement - by which I mean such
organizations as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International - has
earned a lot of respect among activists and perhaps even some world
leaders. Its reputation rests on the
idea that, somehow, it does good work, it advances some cause. I was among the many who firmly believed
this. It seemed entirely
reasonable. As the years roll into decades,
it is reasonable no longer. A hard look
at the movement's achievements and prospects indicates it has very little to
show for its dedicated efforts. Given
its present activities and overall approach, it has virtually no chance of
doing more. Yet a change in strategy
might, after all, bring important results.
Anyone who cares more about human rights than about human
rights pieties might ask the following questions. What has the human rights movement
achieved? How has its approach helped or
hurt the cause of human rights? How can
the movement improve its performance?
What follows offers some answers.
What has the human
rights movement achieved?
The realities are suggested by the statement of a Human
Rights Watch official on the death of Ariel Sharon:
“It’s a shame that Sharon has gone
to his grave without facing justice for his role in Sabra and Shatilla and
other abuses,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director
at Human Rights Watch. “His passing is another grim reminder that years of
virtual impunity for rights abuses have done nothing to bring
Israeli-Palestinian peace any closer.”
Sarah Whitson's comment is telling: something similar could have been said of
thousands and thousands of murderers and torturers, great and small. I don't mean over the course of history; I
mean among those who've attracted the attention of human rights organizations.
Though there has been progress towards respecting human
rights in some countries, usually this hasn't been the doing of the human
rights movement. In Chile, Paraguay,
Uruguay and Argentina, not to mention Cambodia, South Africa, and Libya, change
came with the fall of oppressive régimes.
The new governments instituted their own tribunals which had little or
nothing to do with international human rights organizations. The most substantial achievement of these
organizations has been the war crimes trials in ("the former")
Yugoslavia, which (a) convicted some offenders, (b) did so partly on evidence
collected by human rights investigators, (c) did so in tribunals such as human
rights organizations have consistently and persistently promoted. The fairness of these tribunals is not at
issue here: it's hard to be sure if
there was bias and it's also hard to object to
at least some of the verdicts.
But this success nevertheless has more influence than it deserves. It's not because processes were flawed. It's because the anomaly of the success
hasn't been appreciated. The
circumstances are not just unusual. They
are also increasingly unlikely to repeat themselves.
The case of Yugoslavia is anomalous because Western
democracies were not really intervening in an ongoing crisis; they were there almost at its birth. They took a particular interest in and
assumed unusual responsibility for the course of events. The West was politically involved in the
initial dissolution of the country, when the EEC attempted to arbitrate the
dispute. Soon thereafter Germany, at
first over UK and French objections, pushed recognition of Croatia by the
EEC. Moreover the West encountered no
effective opposition to its pro-dissolution agenda. Serbia's ally on the UN
Security council, Russia, was on the brink of collapse and dependent on the
West for financial support. (In the 90s, Russia's GDP fell by a catastrophic
50%.) China, another ally, was not yet ready to take the world stage on its
own.
However substantial the success of the UN and human rights
movement in Yugoslavia, it did not mark an advance towards a world order that
respected human rights. On the contrary,
it was a symptom of a radical and very temporary great power imbalance. This became clear in the late 1990s, when
Russia began to reassert itself in Chechnya and Kosovo. Subsequent years have shown increasing
movement away from an international
consensus on human rights. Libya's
uprising confirmed the change in direction:
Russia and China, outmanoeuvred, committed themselves to frustrate any
further efforts to enforce human rights according to the West's and the NGOs'
agendas. Important secondary powers like
India and Brazil have more discretely adopted a similar stance.
The issue of prospects aside for a moment, what have human
rights organizations achieved since their inception in the 1960s? Part of the answer, but only part, has to do
with perpetrators brought to justice. In
the special case of Yugoslavia there have been 67 convictions in the last
twenty years. Perhaps this is a lesson
to those who lack powerful backers and commit crimes in Western Europe's back
yard. It must be set against the rest of
the record.
This record can be evaluated in terms of justice, of deterrence, and of protecting
human rights.
Has justice been
served? Only a tiny, tiny proportion of
offenders have been convicted of any crime as a (partial) result of human
rights activity. In this narrow sense,
justice has not been served. Thousands
guilty of horrible crimes, far far more than those convicted, have not met with
any judicial sanction at all.
A multitude of failures cast a dark shadow over the
movement's modest, anomalous Yugoslav success.
Elsewhere, after all the atrocities committed in all these years, the
human rights movement has managed to help convict only one leader, Charles
Taylor of Liberia (as far as I know).
Other Liberian monsters like General Butt Naked have gone scott
free. The Cambodian genocide trials are
barely functional, partly for lack of funding.
Rios Mott in Guatemala has yet to meet justice, thirty years after he
visited utter horror on his country. So
have the mass murderers of Indonesia and the Congo. So have the torturers of Burma, Brazil,
Mexico, Colombia, the Gulf States, Algeria (including the French colonists),
Morocco, El Salvador and many other places.
Those who actually do the torturing have perhaps never been so much as
charged, much less convicted. They enjoy
even more impunity than the leadership.
Justice has not been served.
No one would deny or be surprised by this. Presumably the point of all these
investigations, accusations, and, in some rare cases, trials and convictions,
is deterrence.
To see how tenuous the case for deterrence is, you probably
only need to examine your own beliefs.
Now, after half a century of human rights activism, few can seriously
believe that the police torturers of the world are worried about the
International Criminal Court. There
certainly isn't the slightest evidence of it.
Nor is it easier to imagine how rulers, typically impressed by their own
power, are going to be frightened of some distant court that has on rare
occasion, in special circumstances quite unlike those today, meted out rather
gentlemanly punishment to a few ageing wrong-doers. Human rights violators will be far more
concerned with their own domestic unrest, and rightly so. Someone bent on wreaking agony on human
beings is unlikely to be scared off by far-off, theoretical considerations, by
the idea that possibly someone, sometime, in circumstances that can't quite be imagined, might possibly bring
them to justice.
If we believe in the importance of deterrence as
justification for human rights activism, we believe in a remote ideal. Since the worst and most massive human rights
violations normally occur within uncooperative sovereign states, effective
enforcement of human rights conventions requires a supranational enforcing
agency. The idea of judicial sanction as
deterrence against human rights violations therefore implies something like
world executive power, either through a world government or some utterly
dominant nation. For a brief historical moment
- with the unchallenged supremacy of the US in the 1990s - the second
possibility seemed close to reality. The
moment is emphatically past and the prospect of effective enforcement is now a
mere dream. So, then, is notion that
human rights activism can substantially contribute to the deterrence of human
rights violations, now or in the foreseeable future.
How, then, does human rights activism protect human rights, presumably the point of it all? Amnesty has had success in the comparatively
mild sort of cases that came to prominence in the 1960s. Amnesty's letter-writing campaigns have
'contributed' to the release nonviolent individual 'prisoners of conscience' -
40,000 by Amnesty's count, though no one knows whether the campaigns were
crucial to the releases. But the concern
for these sorts of cases, sadly, is almost outmoded - if it was ever
appropriate. Just as Amnesty's
letter-writing never addressed, for example, the massive human rights
violations committed by the US in Vietnam or the slaughter in Indonesia, so it
never touches the real horrors of today.
The idea that such campaigns would ever do anything for the victims of
the genocide in Rwanda or the victims of state torturers around the world is a
non-starter.
Human rights organizations address these dreadful cases
through the judicial model. They
document. On extremely rare occasion
that eventually leads to punishment.
Never, not in a single case among all the hundreds of thousands, does it
actually protect anyone. Once the
illusion of deterrence is dispelled, once the actual protection of human rights
is seen as the objective, the human
rights movement has so far been an utter failure. Since the quasi-judicial approach addresses
human rights violations only after the fact, this cannot change until these
organizations change their fundamental approach.
How have the
strategies of human rights organizations helped or hurt the cause of human
rights?
Letter-writing and attempting to indict violators has done
next to nothing to help the cause of human rights - if by that is meant actually
protecting people from human rights violations.
Human rights organizations realize this, so that for some time they have
attempted to go further. They signal out
massive human rights violations in well-documented reports, and call for action
against them. (These reports are already
obsolescent in the age of ubiquitous cell-phone videos. In contrast to even a decade ago, the reports
rarely document what isn't already public knowledge.) But their allegiance to the model of world
judicial sanctions undermines their efforts and perhaps has even hurt their
cause.
This happens in two related ways. First, the quasi-judicial approach leads
human rights organizations to treasure
their reputation for impartiality.
In Syria, for example, Human Rights Watch examines human rights
violations; it has done so for decades.
It now finds violations on both sides of the conflict. All parties, it seems, are bad. All should be hauled before the International
Criminal Court. The idea of backing one
against the other cannot so much as arise; one can only imagine opposing
both. That Syrians should determine
their own fate now seems out of the question:
after all, apart from some utterly powerless do-gooders, they are
divided into criminal factions! The only
possible reaction is that 'the whole thing is a mess' and must remain so until
some august outside authority takes matters in hand.
This first problem leads to a second. When human rights organizations step out of
their quasi-judicial role and attempt to address political realities, their
recommendations are feckless to the point of dishonesty. The meticulously documented reports of mass
atrocities tacitly acknowledge the impotence of the judicial approach by
demanding 'action'. But the action
demanded is invariably known to be ludicrously insufficient.
Here are some examples.
In October 2013, HRW issued a major report documenting the
torture and killing of political detainees.
What to do? Their acting director for the Middle East and North Africa, Joe Stork, said that
“All governments and especially Security Council member countries should put
the plight of these thousands of political detainees high on their agenda for
diplomatic discussions.” Their press release added that :
"Concerned governments need to make clear that the Syrian government and
those responsible for the abuse will ultimately face justice for their
actions."
In January 2014, commenting on the release of 55,000
gruesome photographs of people who died under torture in Syrian prisons, HRW
director Kenneth Roth reacted by demanding more of diplomacy:
“It is essential that the mass atrocities
being committed in Syria be a parallel focus of any diplomatic effort,”... [Roth]
called for an end to the indiscriminate killing of civilians and an opening of
Syria’s borders for humanitarian aid. “We cannot afford to wait for the distant
prospect of a peace accord before the killing of 5,000 Syrians a month comes to
an end.”
On twitter, HRW complained that "Russia has protected
Syrian govt from international action, whether explicit condemnation, an arms
embargo, or referral to ICC".
Invariably, the reactions of human rights organizations are
couched in these quasi-judicial terms.
What does this amount to? Where
Syria is concerned, a useless, pointless scolding of Russia and China. HRW knows very well that Russia and China
will block any attempt by the West to "meet its responsibility to protect
civilians." Such attempts would
therefore be illegal, proscribed by the international law HRW holds so
dear. HRW would never encourage the West
to violate that law. It would therefore
never suggest that, if civilians can't be protected legally, they must be
protected illegally. But that means the
movement can make no serious suggestion at all.
Indeed the only real action mentioned, an arms embargo, suggests that
HRW has no genuine interest even in recommending protective measures, because
it knows full well that an arms embargo would do nothing to stop the régime's
sadistic orgy.
HRW's recommendations are just as much a conscience-salving
fig-leaf as the empty protestations of the Western powers. But no one would reproach HRW in these terms,
because no one expects HRW to actually accomplish anything. The idea is to fight the good fight, that is,
to gather up documents which won't matter now, but which are the sort which
might matter sometime, decades down the road, in the unlikely event that a
genuine international order takes root.
Here HRW and its acolytes exhibit the great sense of leisure that
discredits so many liberal, allegedly well-meaning initiatives. Decades, hundreds of thousands of
victims? no problem. we have lots of time.
The basic ideological problem of the human rights movement
is that it works towards two goals: the
establishment of a just, rights-upholding international order, and the
protection of real human beings who suffer horrible 'violations of their human
rights'. By this I mean protecting
people from torture and agonizing death.
These goals are considered inseparable, even obviously so. In fact they are opposed.
You can work towards the vague possibility that, sometime in
some unknowable future, the nations of the world will all get together and
agree to enforce human rights, wherever and whenever they are violated, no
matter whose interests are at stake.
This is a very long-term goal and it requires, or is taken to require,
scrupulous judicial procedure in respected international forums. The goal of protecting real human beings from
grievous outrage is very different. It
is a very short-term goal. It is the goal
of people in a hurry, people who have a sense of urgency. Taken seriously, it very often requires
disregard for international law, contempt for international institutions, and
willingness to use 'illegal' violence, unauthorized by any world body. The human rights movement has chosen the
former goal. That's why it has done
virtually nothing to advance the latter.
How can the movement
improve its performance?
If human rights organizations were locked into the
quasi-judicial approach to protecting human rights, there would be no prospect
of improvement. But they're not courts;
they're not locked in. The reason their
impotent complaints are so disappointing is that these organization may - we
can't be sure - have some real political influence. Certainly they are widely and deeply
respected and they raise their voices just at a time when, in the Syrian case,
at least Western governments are apparently quite unsure how to act. Perhaps the right sort of activism from human
rights organizations could move public opinion and even governments towards
effective action. But to do that, the
movement would have to recommend effective action, not rule it out.
For a start, human rights activists would have to be
acknowledge that only force, only military intervention or arming an
opposition, has any chance of preventing human rights violations in the worst
and most massive cases. Acknowledging
this means accepting that, here in the real world, effective action to halt
mass torture and murder must be expected to be impure. It will involve other, lesser but still
important violations of human rights. If
there is intervention, there will very likely be war crimes. If an armed opposition is supported, the same
- and concern for these violations might require calls to restrain the
fighters, not calls to avoid arming impure saviours. In short, the human rights movement will go
nowhere until it involves itself in real politics, not in prissy calls for
international cooperation that everyone knows won't happen. Only then can the 'duty to protect' become
more than a barren abstraction.