George
Monbiot asserts that
the Common Cause Foundation has made the 'transformative' discovery that people
aren't very selfish. Or maybe it's not
so transformative because, he say, science knew that all along. Consistency aside, we should shun
"philosophers from Hobbes to Rousseau" (among others) because their
accounts were "catastrophically mistaken".
This
is what you get when someone doesn't know the limits of his competence. It's wrong about philosophers (and economists)
in a number of ways, and the survey's findings can hardly be 'transformative'.
For a start, it is childish to make a big deal of this survey. Yes, a large majority, when you ask, say nice
things rather than nasty things. That's
not behaviour. Only a biologist who
knows nothing of surveys or psychology could be so clueless. People who actually look at society (e.g. Robert Putnam) have pointed to a decreasing interest in public
goods: no 'transformative' bunch of
verbal responses can undermine that finding.
And innate selfishness, regarding these researchers, is a straw man. They don't go on about 'selfishness' but
about the decay of institutions that have effects not at all attributed to
innate human characteristics.
As
for philosophers from Hobbes to Rousseau...
First,
every single social contract theorist and classic philosopher who's made
assertions about self-interest has noted that self-interested desires include other-regarding desires. These are universally assumed to extend at
least to immediate family, but could reach much further. So no philosopher has asserted that people
are 'selfish' in any relevant sense.
Second,
all well-known social contract theorists have asserted that the state of nature
is a construct within a thought experiment, a state of affairs which may or may
not have occurred. This can hardly be
'mistaken'.
Third,
Rousseau came closest to seeing the state of nature as a reality but in the
Discourse on Inequality he suggests
that orangutans may be the original, natural man. In other words he situates the state of
nature in, well, nature, millions of years before the emergence of the genus
homo, never mind homo sapiens. Given
that and an only very slightly generous reading of the text, he then makes
pretty good sense. Moreover he spends a
great deal of time presenting his view on the emergence and decisive importance
of sympathy and empathy. By no stretch
of the imagination does he conceive of the human beings who form societies as
'selfish'; quite the contrary.
Fourth,
Hobbes and other social contract theorists do not assert that humans are
naturally 'selfish' even in the broad sense that includes other-regarding
desires. To take Hobbes, he says that
humans are set one against another, not because of innate selfishness or greed
or aggression, but because they compete for an irreducibly scarce commodity -
security. (Leviathan I.13) And for
Hobbes the state of nature is simply a state where contemporary humans lack
government - for example, Yugoslavia in time of civil war. This has nothing whatever to do with
"our innate, ancestral characteristics", Monbiot's witless take on
the state of nature.
Fifth,
the theories about altruism with which I'm familiar are weak. Game theorists (some in biology) note that
altruism is 'logical' in the sense that those who simply retaliate do worse in
a *series* of games than those who don't.
But, as other theorists have noted, this doesn't carry much weight
because in the real world, retaliation can end the series of games.
Then
there's David Gauthier, who argues
that, in a certain population, socially minded 'constrained maximizers' do
better than narrow, 'straightforward maximizers'. But his reasoning sneaks in assumptions
about the proportion of one to another, and about the trust that constrained maximizers
are rational to afford one another.
These assumptions are accepted by approximately no one. In any case, as already noted,
straightforward maximizers may well have other-regarding desires. Gandhi might well have counted as a
straightforward maximizer.
Finally
Monbiot might want to consider the varieties of 'altruism' before he gets
enthusiastic about it. If I go out of my
way to help others, even make sacrifices for them, I may do so out of loyalty
to my family or town or region or clan or tribe, my country or race or ethnic
group or co-religionists. (Animal
loyalties, too, may not extend to their entire species.) I might also, out of those same loyalties,
harm 'outsiders' whom I see, rightly or wrongly, as a threat. Or I might harm them simply to obtain some
benefit for 'my' people. A great many
atrocities are committed largely out of altruistic love for others, that is,
for certain others.
It
is a shame that Monbiot deploys his rubbish to pronounce on serious matters
like Syria. That degrades rather than
enhances an understanding of the horror that transpires there.