Many abhor
the Assad régime and say that 'something must be done'. This typically means 'by People like Us',
Westerners who know how to behave morally -
an odd restriction given the only world leader consistently to support
the rebels against Assad is Erdogan, the president of Turkey. Western leaders (contrary to the left's
'anti-imperialist' faith) will never do anything against Assad. They don't want to confront Russia and they
like Assad's hostility to all Islamists - as do their electorates.
Yet Turkey
is officially allied with these Western powers.
They incessantly reproach Turkey for not doing enough about ISIS - even
though, one would think, the whole Western alliance plus Russia plus the Iraqi
Kurds plus Iran and its Iraqi proxies should be able to get the job done
without Turkey's help. No matter. Because Turkey opposes America's Syrian
proxy, an affiliate of the Kurdish PKK, Erdogan is treated like a naughty boy -
a 'difficult ally'. This slant does much
to undermine Erdogan's attempt to drag the West, tooth and nail, into putting
its money where its mouth is when it comes to deploring Assadist atrocities ( -
or at the very least, to stop obstructing aid to the rebels). Western commentators hold against Erdogan his
very open anti-PKK campaign, which they disingenuously portray as some dirty
secret.
There is no
stopping Assad's march of slaughter without giving Turkey freedom to act. The idea that Erdogan is some sort of loose
canon stands in the way of this objective.
Yet it is not Erdogan who has proven an unreliable, indeed treacherous
ally. To appreciate how Turkey has been
maligned, you have to look at its reputation and situation.
The West
has had many decades of treating Turkey with contempt, at least from the time
when, at the outbreak of World War I, the British Royal Navy seized
two battleships constructed for the Ottomans and paid for by donations from the
Turkish public. A piece
by Turkey expert Aaron Stein typifies the condescension with which even the
most well-informed analysts view Turkish affairs. It can serve as a point of departure for
exploring what's wrong with current views of the US-Turkish alliance.
Here is a
passage that gives the flavor of the piece:
...the United States worked for months to
assuage Turkish concerns about the military operation to take Manbij from the
Islamic State. The ground force, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is made up
primarily of the YPG. The YPG, in turn, rely on air support from a variety of
platforms, including drones, A-10s, and allied F-16s based in Turkey. Incirlik
was the hub for the planning of the Manbij operation and, eventually, a meeting
between Arab, U.S., and Turkish officials to reach a final agreement for
the “holding” of the city once ISIL was defeated. The agreement was designed to
assuage Turkish concerns about a heavy Kurdish presence west of the Euphrates,
something that Turkey had warned was a “red-line” in the past and would prompt
military action. Turkey was, without question, difficult to work with during
this time, but it ultimately supported the operation and the American-backed
plan.
In other
words Turkey was reluctant to back an expansion of SDF power; they were
"without question, difficult to work with". Stop a moment and consider exactly what this
is supposed to mean.
The SDF is
nothing but the YPG ("People's Protection Unit"), a Kurdish militia,
with some Arabs recruited for cosmetic purposes. The YPG is an arm of the PKK ("Kurdistan
Workers' Party"), a fact only the PKK occasionally and feebly denies, also
for cosmetic purposes. The PKK and
Turkey have been at war for decades.
This is not
a small war. It involves hundreds of
casualties on both side and extensive use for heavy weapons. It is accompanied by terrorist attacks in
which many civilians die. Most recently,
the PKK broke a truce and killed
three Turkish policemen. The stated reason for this act wasn't any of Turkey's
attacks on the Kurdish people. It was
because the Islamic State had blown up a gathering of young PKK supporters on
Turkish soil.
Turkey
can't make decisive progress against the PKK because it has sanctuary in
Northern Syria. There the PKK has an
alliance of convenience with the Assad régime, also an enemy of Turkey. The US has adopted the YPG, the PKK's Syrian
affiliate, as a proxy against the Islamic State. The US and its 'coalition' have provided the
PKK with huge quantities of weapons and millions of dollars. They have also provided extensive close air
support for PKK operations. This of
course has strengthened the PKK immeasurably, and emboldened them. Reports refer
to "the Kurds’ ambitions, which have been fueled by the support they
have received from the U.S military."
Via its SDF
militia, the PKK has attacked Turkish-backed anti-Assad forces. In so doing it has crossed the Euphrates from
east to west. This is what Turkey termed
a red line, because PKK expansion in that direction promised to give the PKK
control over extensive, crucial stretches of the Syrian-Turkish border. Of course that would facilitate PKK actions
against Turkey immensely. The US agreed
not to let this happen and then did nothing to enforce its agreement.
Because the
geography is so different, it is hard to construct a comparison which helps
decide whether Turkey is being 'difficult'.
But here's a very imperfect attempt.
Suppose Al
Qaeda had established itself in central Canada and conducted intermittently
successful military actions in the American Midwest. It then gained some territory on the New
York-Canada border. The EU, having found
Al Qaeda useful for its own purposes, was pouring arms and money into the AQ
forces using, incredibly, bases in Boston to do so. It gained access to these bases by promising
not to let AQ into New York state. AQ,
however, did deploy in upper New York state, and the EU did nothing about it. Having lost thousands in the fight against
AQ, the US was kinda upset. Did that
make the US a difficult ally?
The example
is absurd because the story can't get started.
A US government that granted the EU bases for supplying Al Qaeda
operations inside the US wouldn't last for a second. So there's no puzzle about Turkish reaction
to US policy except why it was so mild in the first place. Turkey might quite reasonably have withdrawn
its ambassador to Washington at the first suggestion that 'The Coalition'
should have anything to do with the Kurds.
So here's what's really hard to understand: how analysts and news media can muster enough
obliviousness not to marvel at the abuse to which Turkey is
subjected in virtually all discussions of the US/EU/NATO alliance.
None of
this is to deny that or discuss whether the PKK, much less the Kurds, had
excellent reason for every single action they ever mounted against Turkey and
Turks. Maybe they did. The issue is whether Turkey was a difficult
ally. That turns not on whether Turkey
acts with moral justification but on whether the US treats Turkey as allies
normally do. The US does nothing of the
sort.