Monday, March 18, 2013

Summary justice in Syria

World leaders from Iran and Russia to the US and UK seem deeply shocked at summary executions in Syria.  Numerous journalists, NGOs and bloggers tag along.  The outrage may have teeth to it - 'may have' because, though it puts people off arming the rebels, it's not clear that these tender hearts would have favored arming the rebels under any circumstances.

The charges of summary executions are correct.

No doubt the opposition in Syria kill some innocent people, and some people who may be guilty but not obviously so.   These are big problems, and no doubt the opposition's efforts to deal with them, even if sincere, are and will remain inadequate.   There is also little doubt that Western countries, even in wartime, have not practiced summary justice on a comparable scale.  Finally it is no longer as easy to claim that the rebels simply don't have the resources to keep prisoners until their guilt or innocence can be determined in a court of law.

It would be great if these were good enough reasons to suppose that there is some better alternative to summary justice.   But this is far from obvious.  The concerns about summary executions in Syria do not indicate a crisis of justice in Syria.   They indicate an unwillingness to recognize an extreme crisis in the nation-state systems of justice held up as a far superior alternative.  Courts of law, it seems, are not very good at determining guilt or innocence.   This holds for both the courts of nation-states and the international courts of justice.

Nation-state courts

Only one nation-state court system, the American, has been subjected to anything vaguely like scientific study.   Its workings have been scrutinized by The Innocence Project, which reviews previous convictions in (mostly) capital cases and relies heavily on DNA testing.   The result has been proof positive that, in numerous death-penalty trials, the wrong person was convicted.   Limited resources have confined the investigation to a few thousand cases, but these provide some basis for estimating the incidence of wrongful conviction among the rest.   The Project's investigators state that
We will never know for sure, but the few studies that have been done estimate that between 2.3% and 5% of all prisoners in the U.S. are innocent (for context, if just 1% of all prisoners are innocent, that would mean that more than 20,000 innocent people are in prison).
So the low estimate is 46.000; the high estimate 100,000. Large numbers, but not large percentages - are things really so bad?   Well, the estimate doesn't really tell us how many innocents are in prison.   It gets its percentages by comparing the number of exonerations to the number of cases reviewed.  But there most be more wrongful convictions than exonerations.  'Exoneration' involves proof of innocence.  The reviews often couldn't deliver proof:  they were impeded by lack of evidence, the passage of time, and uncooperative authorities. So no one would claim that the process succeeded in proving the innocence of every wrongly convicted person.  So the estimates are for the minimum percentage of innocents wrongfully convicted, those whose innocence could be proven.  So we don't know how much worse things really are.

There is a still greater problem:  when considering nation-state justice as an alternative to summary justice, you want to know not only if the innocent are convicted, but also if  both the innocent and the guilty get a fair hearing.  So you need to know not only of wrongful convictions in the nation-state system, but also of those convicted without a fair trials.   Well in the US, 95% of those convicted  of serious crimes receive no trial at all, because they have made a plea bargain.   Presumably very few of those can be counted as equivalent to fairly convicted.  No wonder lawyers are writing books with chapter titles like "The Myth of the Rule of Law in Capital Cases".   (And probably judicial procedures in non-capital cases are less, not more, fastidious.)  And if the rule of law is a myth in these cases, in this all-dressed-up judicial system, it's no longer obvious why that system is preferable to 'summary executions'.

Summary executions aren't just any sort of extra-judicial killings.  There are extra-judicial killings we can be sure are atrocities, when 2 year old or 80 year old civilians turn up with their bodies battered and mutilated.   Of course is it the régime that does this, not the FSA, not even The Islamists.  But these are not the cases that Western commentators are moralizing about. Their concern is with executions following quick and unofficial trials.  CBS, for example, 'confronted' a 'Jihadist' leader with a video which shows men being executed

They die quickly, by firing squad.

CBS journalists Clarissa Ward  and Scott Pelley call this 'revenge killing'.   On what grounds?   They show no sign of knowing anything about the trial, about the accusations,  about their truth or falsity, nor about what testimony led to convictions.   In most cases, human rights and media types who preach to opposition fighters haven't the slightest idea whether the trial was fair or whether the men are guilty.   All they know is that these events transpired without the false front of fairness and justice behind which lie the judicial travesties that send men to death in the United States.   Death and worse, but Americans do enjoy a good  joke on late-night TV about men who suffer years of oral and anal rape in prison, quite possibly at the hands of mentally disturbed sadists.  This a kind of coup de grace to the integrity of the justice system:  its flawed processes fill prisons where gross and grotesque violations of the rule of law are not only tolerated, but viewed by the citizenry with amusement.  So much for the pretensions of nation-state justice.

International courts

But, someone might say, don't compare extrajudicial killings to nation-state systems.   Compare them to the work of the International Criminal Court.  This court is sometimes taken very seriously.

The ICC may gather some of its prestige from an earlier creation,  the International Court of Justice.   It's gained respect from issuing advisory opinions on international disputes, something like a nation-state's civil courts.   Its verdicts are binding only if the parties antecedently agree to make them so.

The ICC, on the other hand, is something of a joke except to those who invoke it to amplify their piety.   It pretty well makes up rules of evidence and procedure as it goes along.   Its founding statue is not recognized by two Security Council members, the US and China- but in many cases a prosecution can occur only on Security Council approval!  More important, in the ten years of its existence, it has issued warrants for only 21 people, holds five in custody, and has actually convicted a grand total of one, with an appeal pending.   Hence the humor in the notion that the ICC offers some sort of recourse for victims of oppression.

Realities

The inadequacies of nation-state and international justice begin to make the case for summary justice.  The realities of political crime and punishment complete it.   The indisputable fact is that war criminals almost always escape punishment, and often go on to enjoy very good lives.  Even in a tightly controlled environment such as occupied Germany only a tiny fraction of Nazi criminals were convicted.   In Cambodia, hardly anyone will meet any form of punishment.  In Guatemala, the vile Rios Mott, 86, is only now on trial for crimes which ended 17 years ago.   And it's these leaders who are most likely to be prosecuted, not the lower-ranking monsters who do most of the actual killing, torture and mutilation.   This is hardly surprising given that 'due process' demands investigations which, by the time they occur, are too distant from evidence and reliable testimony to be fruitful.   Of course in Syria, to all these reasons for skepticism must be added faith that a reliable criminal justice system will in some unfathomable future arise - and if reliable, a system that far exceeds those currently operating in countries like the US today.

In short, Syrians have a choice between 'summary justice' and none.  That's what they'd likely get if they were foolish enough to heed the fifth-rate moralizing of Western commentators and human rights organizations.  These commentators, if they deserved their prestige, would take to heart the real possibility that summary justice in Syria is probably no more unjust than what is delivered (and not delivered) by national and international courts.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  this updates an earlier piece on the same subject.

Thursday, March 7, 2013

Egypt's army, or The Army's Egypt?

The not-very-discrete dominance of the army may be obvious to all Egyptians, but it's a delicate topic.  What follows makes a case for trying to end this domination.

Who has governed Egypt since 1952?

Nasser was an army man, but there is no doubt he governed, and not the army.   I don't know whether that can be said of Sadat or even Mubarak, but at some point in the post-Nasser era, the army emerged as a political power in its own right.   This power rests in part on popular support, and this in part derives from the army's past glories.   But to invoke these past glories is to replace current realities with an abstraction - not the army of today, but The Army.

The Institution, The Army, is esteemed for its role in the 1952 revolution - because some of its officers played that role.  But these officers are dead.  The Institution, The Army, fought admirably in the wars of 1956-1972 - because its soldiers did.    None of these soldiers, excepting some of the officer corps, are now in service.  The Army today, as an institution and a bunch of individuals, has no real connection to the glories of forty years ago.   These individuals haven't even had an opportunity to prove themselves.

There are indeed some senior officers whose careers began in the old days, but this doesn't make them heroes.    General Al-Sisi, Minister of Defence and Chairman of SCAF, has no combat experience whatever.  General Tantawi, his predecessor, had what is normally called a distinguished military career, but not, as far as I can tell, a heroic one.   He is misleadingly said to have started out as 'an infantryman' in 1956; in fact he began as a commissioned officer in the infantry.   Though he 'fought', i.e., commanded, in several wars, there don't appear to be any tales of great bravery or skill about him.   He may be deserving of respect, but not hero-worship.   Much the same must hold for virtually the entire active officer corps which has never been in any danger.   There may be a few heroes in the army, but there must be many more in the general population, veterans of Egypt's wars.

Perhaps, though, the army is venerated because it has a task fit for heroes, defending the territorial integrity of Egypt.   Here one must ask - against whom?   Egypt has only one serious potential enemy, Israel, and the army has neither the interest nor the capacity to defend against that enemy.   Because the army is wedded to the US, it can never hope to have anything remotely like military parity with Israel.   Since the army and government are well aware of this, they will never break the peace treaty, at least not in circumstances that lead to war.   So Egypt is very secure, in less than honorable circumstances, for reasons having nothing to do with military prowess.  This doesn't sit well with the army's apparently great concern for its 'honor'.

Given the current army's involvement in so many instances of cruelty and injustice, it's hard to see reasons to admire and respect it.

What then of the army's role as a political institution, and its relations with civilian politicians?

Ursula Lindsey notes that if Islamists can stretch the concept of democracy, so can the partisans of military rule.   But she would agree that appropriating a word hardly confers legitimacy.  She might also agree that not all sham democracies are created equal.   I have argued elsewhere that an Islamist 'democracy' in Egypt would be far more changeable - if not open to change - than military rule.   But today, I think, that's not the choice in prospect.  The choice seems to be between military rule in Islamist or in secularist dress.

Many have expressed outrage at Morsi's concessions to the military.  These include what one commentator, The Arabist, calls "unprecedented autonomy (in term of the history of Egypt's constitutional safeguards for the armed forces) in the constitution they backed."   But if these concessions are  new, it's because this was Egypt's first non-military presidency, and the army was confronted with the novel possibility of a government that might defy the military's will.   As for 'granted' and 'autonomy', these may not be the right words.

Morsi's 'grant' looks more like a surrender.   It involved what no leader would abandon except out of pure necessity - power over himself and any civilian successor.   It is simply inconceivable that someone would 'grant' this had he any viable alternative:   it was the price of Tantawi's retirement, and, given the circumstances, the price of Morsi remaining 'in power'.  He isn't really in power because his concessions destroyed whatever power he may have had.  The military has a stranglehold on the government because the post of defense minister must be an officer.

We have seen this before, in pre-World-War-II Japan.   There,
The Army and the Navy also had decisive say on the formation (and survival) of any civilian government. Since the law required that the posts of Army Minister and Navy Minister be filled by active duty officers nominated by their respective services, and since the law also required that a prime minister resign if he could not fill all of his cabinet posts, both the Army and the Navy had final say on the formation of a cabinet, and could bring down the cabinet at any time by withdrawing their minister and refusing to nominate a successor.
Though Egypt's government may not be formally obliged to fall if the defense cabinet post isn't filled, it could hardly survive with no minister in such an important post, especially since this would amount to the military's vote of non-confidence.  The requirement of a defence minister from the army effectively gives the army veto power over any civilian government.  Yet the opposition acts as if this informal dictatorship doesn't given the military enough supremacy.    It endorses the claim that "If Egypt is on the brink of default, if law and order is absent, [the military] has a national duty to intervene."

Egyptians are very rightly insulted when it's said that they're 'learning about democracy', but outside observers could be forgiven for recoiling at horror at something quite different, the opposition's idea of what is appropriate for the army in a serious nation.   For one thing, the idea that default should provoke military rule can only come from someone in the clutches of a colonial mentality, as if the army would now intervene like the British did in 1882!   For another, yes indeed, it is the duty of armies to intervene in certain crises of law and order.   But in nations not already under behind-the-scenes military rule, it's not the army that decides when it is time to intervene.  It's the civilian government.

That anyone could even suggest that the army should be the one to decide when it takes over the country is shocking but not unexpected in a nation where military leaders feel free to make statements for which they would instantly be cashiered elsewhere.   In so many ways, Western nations are contemptible in their management of domestic affairs, but this is one thing most of them have right.   A general has only to offer political opinions in public to end his career.   That generals should presume to call a conference on national reconciliation would be considered inconceivable insolence; that any civilian party would heed the call, pathetic.  Should a reader think I exaggerate, (s)he can consult the remarks for which US general Mcchrystal was forced into retirement - and this by one of America's most timid presidents.

You might reply that Egypt is different.  Indeed it is:  for instance, it differs in the extent to which its military imprisons and tortures its own citizens.   No doubt there are crises in Egypt, but nothing suggests that Egypt's military has either the expertise or the good will to be granted discretion over Egyptian domestic affairs.   Yet this is what it has been granted and this is what much of the opposition wants to extend.

It is a recipe for stagnation as well as subjection.  The army is a society and economy unto itself.   It's doing just fine; its future is bright.  Egypt's problems are not its problems.  Under army rule, Egypt will remain what Hamied Ansari called, in 1986, the stalled society.

Egyptians often speak of what embarrasses them about their country....

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

An afterthought:

Perhaps Morsi and the Brotherhood gave the Army paper supremacy in the hope that they'd be able to tear up the paper later on.  Maybe they think or thought that there is no hope of confronting the army now, but the concessions buy time during which a strong civilian government can emerge, partly through some accommodation with the National Salvation Front.  This strategy, though a long shot, would make sense to me.  However I've no evidence for it.

Sunday, March 3, 2013

How well-armed is the Syrian opposition?

What follows is an afterthought to Syria and the right to know.

The arms channels to the FSA have been uncovered by investigators expert in identifying types of armaments.   The identification process almost always involves examining uploaded YouTube videos.   Naturally these videos are designed to show something of interest to potential viewers, and naturally this means they often display some novel or relatively powerful weapon.

This very likely has led to a disproportionate emphasis on novelty and quality as opposed to quantity.  This emphasis runs up against the frequent assertion, from many quarters, that the rebels 'lack heavy weapons'.   The experts have now observed, several times over, every type of armament the FSA needs to defeat Assad.  True, there aren't any weapons effective against fixed-winged aircraft, but these aircraft are used so crudely and indiscriminately that their main effect is to slaughter civilians - militarily they're not decisive. The FSA has displayed some MANPADS models that should be very effective against helicopters, Assad's most strategically important air asset.   There are also recurrent videos of heavy artillery and capable anti-tank weapons.  And of course we've been offered fairly strong evidence of arms deliveries, perhaps several planeloads, from Croatia.

Despite all this, the FSA has a very difficult time defending its territory and an even more difficult time sustaining offensives.  No one suggests that's for lack of numbers, skill or courage.  The conclusion seems inescapable - the quality and sophistication of arms supplies tell us nothing about their adequacy without more attention to quantities.  But quantities are exactly what can't be ascertained, because videos and journalistic reports can't possibly reveal much about stockpiles throughout Syria.  (Imagine trying to determine how often an individual MANPADS appears in videos or reports.)  Though analysts may have offered evidence for an impressive the range of weapons, the course of the battle strongly suggests that they're not available in anything like sufficient quantities.   Most MANPADS, for example, don't have a particularly high success rate even with trained operators, and acquiring expertise would itself require a large number of firings.   There is basically no prospect of the FSA receiving anything like the required quantities through non-state channels.   It is equally clear that none of the channels come close to supplying arms and ammunition in strategically important quantities.  Other opposition groups are probably in the same position.

So whatever we may hear about current arms supply channels, or about the EU or the US eventually getting around to supplying some unspecified quantity of arms, we have to assume that the supply situation is desperate.   Any disruption of current supply channels has to be seen as a very serious matter indeed.

Friday, March 1, 2013

Syria and the right to know


Syria and the right to know

Recently there has been controversy about research which may have revealed some of the Syrian opposition's supply sources and routes.  How do these revelations weigh against the obligations of journalists and the public's right to know?

The specific professional obligations of journalists can't have much weight here:  journalists like everyone else are supposed to do the right thing.  Their professional obligations and their moral obligations, in this case, converge on the right to know.

When it comes to Syria you have to ask, whose rights are we talking about?  Normally the right to know is considered important because it allows the public to be informed participants in a democratic process, or at least in some sort of political process. If we're talking about Syrians, that sounds silly.  There are no political processes any more; there is a battlefield.  Syrians aren't going to be voting anyone out of office and when the government greets peaceful demonstrations with heavy weapons fire.  So deep concern about the Syrian public's right to know seems inappropriate.

Well, maybe what's important is the right of citizens of the various countries involved to know - Croatia, the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan.  But don't any such rights to be weighed against the harm done to Syrians?   Presumably no one would say that 'our' right to know would justify publishing the names of Syrian government officials planning their defection.   My right to know doesn't trump the right of innocents not to die under torture.

How harmful are the revelations?  That depends on at least two things:  (1) would the information be something Syrian military intelligence might like to have? and (2) would the governments involved be likely to shut down the routes were they made public?

Unless you're pretty sure that Syrian military intelligence already knew about the routes - and how would you be sure of that? - the answer to the first question has to be a firm 'yes'.  Syrian intelligence services are huge, powerful and sophisticated, more than capable of disrupting supply routes abroad.  They would want to disrupt those routes.

The answer to the second question is probably also 'yes'.  Presumably if nation-states didn't want their arms supply moves concealed, they wouldn't have concealed them.  And since all the countries involved could expect domestic and/or foreign opposition to the supply moves, they would have good reason to shut the routes down if made public. (Given Croatia's reaction to the revelations, it's virtually certain that if there was a supply route, they have in fact closed it.)  Yes, the nations involved could discretely establish other routes, but this would probably take a lot of time and severely weaken the supply effort.

Perhaps the revelations about arms supplies are defensible.  Perhaps the revelations weren't detailed enough to expose the routes, or the supplies weren't important, or the routes were bound to be exposed soon anyway, or other routes are easy to set up.  But it will be a lot harder to establish those claims than to arm-wave towards 'the public's' right to know.  It won't be enough to say that the story was put together from publicly available information:  most intelligence work derives from such sources.  And as disturbing as the issue itself may be, to dismiss it with platitudes is more disturbing still.

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Secularist reasons for supporting Morsi? Response to The Arabist


I'm delighted that The Arabist has thought it worth commenting on one of my recent posts, "Secularist reasons for supporting Morsi".   He objects to my claim that the NSF is misguided to choose the army over the Muslim Brotherhood - not because the Brotherhood is a palatable choice, but because (1) real change cannot come with the army in power, (2) effective opposition to Brotherhood policies is possible even with the army out of the political picture.  He says:

"You fail to make the argument as to why 1) secularists should consider the return of the old order a worse outcome that the triumph of Islamists (the reality simply is that many do not) and 2) why secularists should consider their own reliance on the military more distasteful than the alliance with the military made by the Muslim Brotherhood, which granted it unprecedented autonomy (in term of the history of Egypt's constitutional safeguards for the armed forces) in the constitution they backed.

    "While the dominant narrative in the West may have been of a revolution for democracy, the key impetus on which there was wide agreement was a revolution against Hosni Mubarak, his inner circle, and the prospect of his son succeeding him. On everything else, the unity of the revolutionary moment unravels. "
 
I'd like to take these criticisms as an opportunity to plead my case, but first I'll protest that I don't subscribe to the 'Western' narrative about democracy.  (If it's Western, it may have been adopted by much of the secularist opposition.   The NSF regularly cites allegedly undemocratic procedures as a betrayal of the revolution.)  I have specifically rejected the idea that the revolution was for democracy.  I've maintained that the 'unravelling' originated between those who did want democracy - the Islamists who could expect to triumph in elections - and those who wanted freedom, the very sort of liberties they were likely to lose under an Islamist government.  Though I do believe the Islamists either have or can acquire democratic legitimacy, I do not worship democracy and don't think democratic legitimacy can justify the repression of secularist aspirations.   I am under no illusion that democracy must favour freedom or that it will do so in Egypt.   I fear that much of the NSF, however, falls victim to that illusion - at least if they sincerely expect free and fair elections to block an Islamist agenda.   I fear even more that much of the NSF is *not* under any such illusion, and therefore has decided to angle for military intervention.

Despite all this I wouldn't claim that the NSF's "reliance on the military" is more or less distasteful than "the alliance with the military made by the Muslim Brotherhood."   I don't presume to make that sort of judgement.  However  I do feel that the 'alliances' are quite different.

The Muslim Brotherhood can hardly be thought to have embraced the military because they longed for the old-fashioned military rule that lurked behind Mubarak's civilian facade!   The Brotherhood made, it seems, a very tenuous alliance because it was the only way they could ward off a full-fledged military takeover - the extent of their concessions was probably a testimony to the weakness of their position. (Why would they cede more power than they had to?)  The subsequent ventures of the military into politics, their menacing promise to keep public order and their relations with the NSF, are strong evidence that the alliance with the Brotherhood was anything but solid or sincere.  Elements of the NSF, on the other hand, seek a real and sincere alliance with the military - so says The Arabist himself.   And they do so, not to preserve or establish a new order, but to return to the old.

I mean no offense when I ask:  can this really be the will of a people who fought to bravely and endured so much to overthrow the old régime?   Yes, it is rhetoric to speak 'the people' here, but surely there was a moment when the rhetoric was at least close to accurate, and it was considered a glorious triumph.  Never has 'be careful what you wish for' seemed more appropriate.

The Arabist says that the revolutionaries found unanimity in their desire to overthrow Mubarak.   Surely that didn't mean they wanted someone who'd deliver more of the same in some other guise.  They must have wanted change.   The army does not.   If the NSF overthrows Morsi with army help, SCAF will say nice things about keeping out of politics and step right back in whenever it pleases - whenever its behind-the-scenes dictatorship is challenged.   There will be no change.  If Morsi successfully implores the army to suppress anti-government activity - an unlikely prospect - he will become their stooge.  Only an alliance of convenience between the NSF and the Moslem Brotherhood can achieve anything more than a de facto military dictatorship draped with empty judicial niceties.  Indeed only such an alliance can produce a government with enough acceptance and administrative control to address the country's problems.

With the army put firmly in its proper place, the secularists can oppose the Brotherhood as fiercely as they like - and they will have a real government, not a crippled administration, to oppose.   In or out of power, they must come to terms with the Islamists, who certainly won't take their ejection from government lying down.  No doubt the chances of such an alliance prevailing are slim, but to renounce such an alliance is to ensure that those who died, died for nothing at all.

Wednesday, February 13, 2013

Negotiations with Assad? Some dangers


Moaz al-Khatib, leader of the opposition Syrian National Coalition, has proposed negotiations with Assad.  The régime offers shifting counter-proposals.  Though it's hard to assess the whole situation, what's known suggests that negotiations are a non-starter.

For one thing, Assad has a virtually unbroken record of violating whatever he's agreed to.

For another, this time, he will have very plausible excuses for not fulfilling his commitments - plausible at least to the 'international community' which wants, above all, to do nothing.

He can always say, truthfully, that Khatib doesn't really have the means or authority to see that agreements are respected:  there are 'armed groups' who will not accept what he's agreed on. Since so many nations are so scared of  'extremists',  this should work very well.

Should a prisoner release be proposed or even conceded, he can always profess to have 'learned' that among the prisoners are numerous yet-unidentified Al Qaeda operatives, so that the release would endanger public safety.  The supposed identification process could be dragged out indefinitely.

He can always demand a large UN force prior to any withdrawal or resignation to 'protect minority rights'.   He can be confident that deploying such a force will take roughly until the 12th of Never.

He can always divide (if not conquer) by insisting that no agreement is credible without a firm commitment from Khatib to expel any 'Al Qaeda elements' like Jabhat al Nusra, not only from Syria's future, but from all 'sensitive areas', to 'prevent sectarian slaughter'.  This has a decent chance of creating serious armed conflict within the opposition, and it would probably go down well with Obama.  Of course Khatib could not honour any such commitment even if he were foolish enough to make it.

Indeed the negotiation process could easily pit elements of the opposition against one another without any effort on Assad's part.  It's certain that some are bitterly opposed to negotiations; perhaps they would even fight those in favor if too much seemed to be conceded.

 Assad would also probably try to improve his strategic position by calling for truces that would benefit him and not his opponents.  The opposition would be under considerable pressure to agree.

Following the failure of any 'peace initiative', Assad will be at least as strong as before, and the opposition much weaker on the international stage.

Finally, given how many have motive, means and potentially opportunity to kill him, Assad has no reason to believe in any safe exit proposal.  He could justly suppose that his own unilateral arrangements would be far safer, because less well known in advance.

So it's hard to see how negotiations have any prospect of ending the bloodshed.

Thursday, February 7, 2013

The Mean Girls weigh in on Syria


Calm reflection forces a conclusion:  “Two years of meta-narratives:  how not to cover Syria”, by Audrey Ann Lavallée-Bélanger and Ella Wind, is utterly harmless.  They're just havin’  fun with a Mean Girls take on people who write about Syria.  No one will suffer because of their piece.  But actual pro-Assad propaganda aside, they have produced what may just be the most distasteful article on Syria yet.

They have cute things to say about the missteps of amateurs, the posturing of experts, the Syrian-Americans overplaying their tenuous connections to their supposed homeland, the pretentious Beltway Analysts, the over-the-top FSA apologists, the grumpy anti-imperialists.   What really matters to the authors, the important common factor uniting all these types, is that they’re all such losers.  It's embarrassing!

What I want to know is:  why Syria?   No one cracked jokes about reporting from Stalingrad, or the concentration camps, or today, from the Congo, or yesterday, from the Tamil  enclave.   No one got witty about reporting on 9-11, or the Iraq war.  People do make jokes about individual journalists like Tom Friedman or Robert Fisk, but they do not indulge in sweeping hilarity about reporting a whole conflict. Why would Syria be an exception?

No reason.  The deep nastiness of the article doesn’t come merely from its connection with a panoply of horrors.  Syrians joke constantly, and brilliantly, about their situation. And it's not about who has the right to joke - a joke is funny or not, whoever makes it.  It’s rather that the authors are utterly oblivious to the need to take sides - so much so that they are unaware of the side they have taken.

Their position emerges from the snark of their send-ups.  The Amateur Journalist is a dummy because he believes the Idlib warlord’s bullshit about an inclusive future - which will however exclude “women, young people, and Alawites” .  The Seasoned Journalist, who holds that Assad and his “regime are bad but so is the opposition” is, incomprehensibly, a cynical “advocate for a Free Syria”.  The Syrian-American FSA Revolutionary is a poser, utterly deserving of ridicule - only his maternal great-grandmother "was born in Damascus and immigrated to the US in her childhood.". The Activist is a wannabe media star, whose ridiculous idea is: “ get rid of Assad first, by whatever means, and talk about other problems later (critiquing abuses from the opposition will only be counter-productive).”No doubt these parodies are meant to be balanced by The Beltway Analyst and the Fumigating [sic] Anti-Imperialist, but, tellingly, these people are nowhere near the Middle East and have no involvement on either side.  In other words, everyone seriously pro-FSA is a bit of an asshole. To top this off we get a concluding paragraph and more sarcasm: "there is no doubt that their ideas are meant to move forward a peaceful resolution of the conflict."

So there are two messages here.   One is that what matters is whether people are of good character, that is, whether they are unpretentious, self-effacing, prudent, and above all, free of any association with clichés.   The other this that the right position on Syria is the detached position:  indeed these women are as distant as The Beltway Analyst, with the same air of mature superiority.   Here's how we're told to think:  we should be sceptical of reports from both sides; we should worry about Women and Kurds and Alawites.   We should acknowledge that Assad is bad, that the FSA isn't that great.   Beyond that, somebody should maybe try to do something to "move forward a peaceful resolution of the conflict."   That's the word as of 5 February 2013.

These sophisticated thinkers have, in other words, adopted approximately the position of Obama and the feckless Europeans.   Like Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi, and other disgraceful platitude-machines, they want a 'peaceful resolution of the conflict'.   They kind of maybe like the opposition a little bit, apparently because it's included some well-groomed brave young people, not just oldsters like the FSA leader in Idlib with the 'long scruffy beard'.   But what we absolutely mustn't do is - to repeat -  "get rid of Assad first, by whatever means, and talk about other problems later."

Well, that's pretty much exactly what we should do.   We should not, that is, stand stylishly at a distance and snipe at both sides, justifying our pot-shots with the very serious underlying message that Assad is bad but others are worrisome and there ought to be a peaceful resolution of the 'conflict'- such a nice antiseptic word.  And the refusal to offer whole-hearted support for the FSA is nothing but a gift to Assad, a moral failure far more serious than the pretensions of activists or the credulity of amateur journalists.   Better to be a poser who's on the right side than someone who titters from Olympian heights about a slaughter.

Doubtless the authors would insist they were only making light of reporting about a slaughter.   True, that's what they offer, buttressed by a sub-text - since we're talking not just narratives  but meta-narratives -  that we should watch the show from somewhere and wish for peace, good writing and objectivity.   You can't get much colder.