I am in no position to predict whether Morsi is actually set to become a dictator, or anything else about his plans. I don't presume to say what is best for Egypt. However some leftists and liberals appear to believe that Morsi's decrees are themselves some sort of constitutional disaster. This is unreasonable. It rests on notions of legality and legitimacy that are, in the current circumstances, inappropriate. You cannot coherently apply the political principles of a settled state to a state under construction.
One commentator asserts that “Egypt is facing a horrifying coup against legitimacy and the rule of law and a complete assassination of the democratic transition.”
One wonders what country this person is describing. The rule of law does not exist in Egypt. It is flouted at every turn by the police, the army, and indeed the judiciary which protect their abuses. Human Rights Watch reports that "Egyptian police and military officers have arrested and detained over 300 children during protests in Cairo over the past year, in some cases beating or torturing them," courts regularly exonerate those guilty of such abuses. What then is so sacred about the institutions that Morsi clearly intends to remake? And how could he remake them while remaining within the protocols and laws which were created by the old régime and are deployed to protect its remnants? Until these old institutions are swept away, there is no revolution, yet many self-described revolutionaries seem shocked by the very idea of such a thing. They call for the rule of law, and reproach Morsi for failing to end police and army abuses. Yet they complain when he tries to build the power that would permit a cleanup, that would establish a rule of law.
But it is not just that laws are flouted: there is no rule of law because, properly speaking, there is no law. There are the old régime's statutes whose foundation, the old constitution, has been rejected. No new constitution replaces it and there is no uncontestedly recognized legislature to give the old statutes even temporary validity. The low-level, criminal-law components of these statutes are followed for good reason, to ward off anarchy: it wouldn't be a good idea for the authorities to act as if there were no laws against murder and robbery. But the idea that there is existing legal edifice that Morsi has demolished is ludicrous. His decrees do not touch the low-level statutes that keep some sort of order in society. At the same time they cannot violate the rule of some supposed higher-level law that would allocate the powers of the state to various institutions. Any supposed 'law' of that sort has neither legal reality nor immediately practical necessity.
As for legitimacy, Morsi acts according to the closest thing to legitimacy available, an election win. In a state, legitimacy would be conferred by the state's democratic institutions, normally a parliament, and normally established by a constitution recognized as valid. But there is no parliament in session and accepted as legitimate - though if there were, it would certainly endorse Morsi! As for the judiciary, a product of the old régime, it is hard to understand what legitimacy it could claim, since the old régime itself is seen as illegitimate. In other words, this is not the judiciary whose operations span a transition from one democratically validated administration to another. It is a judiciary deeply implicated in assaults on democratic government. Its bogus claims to legitimacy in the actual process should not be mistaken for valid claims within a democratic process.
What then of the claim that Morsi has seized absolute power? This too is wrong-headed. The decree doesn't give Morsi absolute power; because that's not something a decree can do. It would give him absolute power if combined with firm control of the state, but he doesn't have anything of the sort. He can't, because there isn't a state. There is a presidency. There are various institutions, often at odds with the presidency, without a parliament that can sort things out, or a constitution on the basis of which to do the sorting. Morsi's decree is just a bid for the authority to bring the old institutions to heel. Yes, it may be part of some totalitarian plot, but there's no indication of that so far. If he put off the formation of parliament or the drafting of the constitution, that would be another matter.
Can Morsi be trusted when, through his spokesman, he claims the power grab is temporary? Of course not, and it has been many years since Egyptians could be accused of trusting their leaders. Renouncing appeals to the rule of law doesn't mean abandoning a struggle to contain the Islamist trend in Egyptian politics and it does not mean endorsing Morsi, or softening demands for change. But such demands should not invoke bogus legalisms, and those who do the demanding should realize that they are not necessarily the defenders of the Egyptian democracy. The opposition tries to take on the mantle of January 25th, but in a very different context. The thousands who protest would be more plausible guardians of the revolution did their numbers not include and get support from the partisans of the old régime. As Soraya Morayef remarked on twitter, "Worrying that ppl who once said protesters deserve to be shot coz they're dirty vandals now very enthusiastic about them burning down MB HQs."
It's hard to avoid the conclusion that opposing Morsi at this point strengthens the worst elements of the old régime. It's not for me to say whether this is a price worth paying, but surely it should give pause to progressive forces. It's worth remembering that it was not the 25th that sealed the revolution but February 1st, when the streets were filled, not with tens of thousands, but hundreds of thousands. Among them were those who became the electoral majority that brought Morsi to power. To all appearances they still support today him today, and it is the secularist minority that oppose him.
The opposition's ideological problem lies primarily in its invocation of law and democracy. There is no law to invoke, and at this stage, democracy manifests itself not in formal institutions but in popular will. Yet the opposition's demands may well run counter to popular will. You can't have everything. Perhaps the opposition is fighting for freedom, not democracy. They're not the same thing.
To have a democracy that is functional, Morsi needs to form a government that has the support of various factions. Not that they agree with the policies but that they agree with the process by which policies are arrived. At that requires more than a bare majority it requires a consensus. Caution and checks on power are a necessary and important part of that. There are a huge number of people in Egypt who do not want to live in the sort of country the Muslim Brotherhood, possibly with majority support, wishes to create. Morsi needs to create political options for them to address their concerns. To quote Lyndon Johnson you want your enemies inside the tent pissing out, not outside the tent pissing in. Right now they are outside the tent pissing in.
ReplyDeleteCanada with Quebec has always made it clear that if there ever was serious opposition to remaining part of Canada they could leave. That English speaking Canada would not use massive state terror to impose English Canadian norms on Quebec. Thus Pauline Marois has 0 fear of Stephen Harper even though she doesn't like him very much. Contrast that with Morsi. The Muslim Brotherhood just sentenced 7 Copts to death for their limited involvement in a movie trailer. I have a very hard time seeing why any progressive should be supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood as a long term solution to Egypt. The secularists and the Copts have ever reason to be jumping in bed with counter revolutionaries. And if Morsi doesn't watch himself the Copts are going to be jumping in bed with Russian or American or Israeli or Chinese Intelligence very soon. Which is precisely the sort of thing democratic leaders are supposed to prevent. The closest thing I can see to a decent government for Egypt is the secular minority. Why wouldn't progressives and for that matter just about any westerner hope for their success?
Can't agree - many democracies run on bare majorities for a long time. In any case I'm not saying people have to accept Morsi's agenda. I'm saying that his attack on the judiciary isn't an assault on democracy or the rule of law, but on the old régime. Siding the the judiciary could be a lot more dangerous than letting Morsi clear them out. The verdict against the Copts is the judiciary's work, not Morsi's or the Muslim Brotherhood's! The persecution of Copts goes back long before the Brotherhood had any power.
ReplyDeleteThe truth is Egyptian society has become heavily Islamic if not Islamist in the past couple of decades - if people didn't want an Islamic government, they shouldn't have fought for democracy. The Islamist trend has fed off 60 years of military, secularist, unrepresentative government, and won't be stifled by anything but a return to dictatorship. If secularists want something else they have to start delivering something to the people rather than fighting a crucial purge of the old-régime bureaucracy.
You make several assumptions here:
Delete- "if people didn't want an Islamic government, they shouldn't have fought for democracy."
People did not fight for democracy, they fought to overthrow Mubarak. The democracy that many wanted (but was not the main goal of the protests, or only become so post-facto and by necessity of having a narrative beyond overthrowing Mubarak).
Secondly, an Islamic government is not necessarily a democratic one. Mubarak has an Islamic government (the presence of Islam in the constitution, and as a state religion suggests this).
Thirdly, while many were prepared to take a chance on Islamists coming to power, this does not mean that they were prepared to concede elements of what they consider to be democracy. In a country with very strong legalism in the political culture, respect for the judiciary and its decisions is part of the package of what is considered to be the package of democracy. Likewise, that Morsi carried out an "auto-coup" and the dubious constitutional legitimacy of his November 22 decree is a sound base of attack for many.
Finally, your line of reasoning that Egypt is still in a revolutionary moment (I agree) does not mean that revolutionary legitimacy prevails, especially for an actor that has subverted revolutionary legitimacy in favor of a transitional constitutional legitimacy in cooperation with the army. If it was in favor of revolutionary legitimacy, why did the Brotherhood become the main ally of the military in securing a transitional legitimacy in the form of the referendum on the interim constitutional declaration of March 2011?
Your final paragraph in your post - that there is no law to invoke - is simply not the Brotherhood's attitude, because it largely shares the legalistic mindset that is mainstream in Egypt (but is occasionally willing to trump it for personal gain.) Even when you wrote this post on November 24, 2012, it was inaccurate to say that there is no rule of law because there is no constitution. There was a constitution (the March 2011 constitutional declaration), and by the standards of your own writings on the primacy of popular will (as expressed, I assume, through electoral events) it is the most legitimate type of legitimacy of all in the past two year period since it had both the most decisive result (over 74% in favor) and the largest degree of popular participation (60%). That is the consequence of your approach to this question, which is clearly erroneous in my view, especially considering that the administration of the electoral events has left much to be desired.
Thank you for your comment. This is part 1 of the reply because blogger won't permit putting everything in at once.
Delete(re 1st assumption:) I entirely agree, I was wrong to say that people 'fought for democracy', more or less for your reasons. I believe that some people fought for freedom (and the overthrow of Mubarak), a quite different matter. I hope my later post, Freedom versus democracy in Egypt, was a better assessment.
No doubt democracy was in the forefront of some people's agenda: 'islamists' (very broadly speaking) who were probably sure that, with Mubarak's fall, they would take power through elections. However I do believe that many now in the NSF did indeed think of themselves as fighters for democracy - at least if you'd asked them at the time. They may still think so, but this conviction seems to me, well, unreflective.
That said, my incorrect statement was more a gratuitously snide remark than an assumption - I made no such assertion in the actual post. What people fought for has no obvious bearing on whether Morsi violated the rule of law.
(re 2nd assumption:)
Certainly an Islamic government isn't necessarily democratic, but an elected Islamic government has democratic legitimacy. The difference is between popular sovereignty and the workings of a state which has such sovereignty. Supposing the elections that brought Morsi into office legitimate - I realize this is disputed - he and his administration can claim the democratic legitimacy derived from popular sovereignty even if he seeks to establish institutions that are less than democratic. This is not hair-splitting or unimportant, because virtually all electoral democracies (e.g. in Western countries) establish institutions and/or procedures which, arguably, are undemocratic.
Maybe more important, I argue that Morsi has in fact not been able to establish a full-fledged government because he hasn't a solidly established legislature or control over fundamental state institutions. Nor is he defying firmly established state institutions because the revolution called the judiciary's legitimacy into question. So I'd question the claim that there is an Islamic government or indeed any full-fledged government at all. In these conditions it makes little sense to speak of a rule of law.
[part 2 of the reply]
Delete(re 3rd point)
I agree with most of your third point but again, people's expectations don't have much bearing on whether one can speak of violating the rule of law. Of course my entire post is an attempt to refute the 'auto-coup' claim. I guess I'd say that since one can't in these circumstances speak of 'constitutional legitimacy', Morsi can neither claim it nor can his opponents. The claims and counter-claims refer to something that just doesn't exist.
(re 4th point)
Um, um, this is something I hadn't even considered and I'm pretty well flummoxed. I take it this has to do with whether Morsi can reasonably be said to have betrayed the revolution. Hard to answer, since the revolution had no one voice and, in retrospect, encompassed divergent objectives. (I'd also be inclined to say, it's too soon to tell.) My post was intended to address objections to Morsi based on legal and political theory, and I don't feel able to offer an opinion on revolutionary legitimacy.
[part 3 of the reply]
Delete(re 5th point)
I certainly agree that the Brotherhood would never admit, even to themselves, that there's no law - neither would I in their shoes! As for the rest, I partly agree, but not enough to make a difference to my claims.
The post argues against legalistic objections to Morsi but its defense of Morsi's legitimacy is very limited. I focus on democratic legitimacy because that's an underlying concept of the debates, not because I personally think it sacred or unassailable. And I claim that Morsi has as much of it as can be expected in these circumstances, not that he's got all one could want. After all, the less one can speak of legitimacy, the more my claim that there's no rule of law is established.
Well, how much legitimacy is there, and for what? Three points. One, a constitutional declaration isn't enough to establish law. There also have to be functioning legislative and judicial institutions, as well as an enforcement arm firmly within the control of the state. I'd deny that the performance of Egypt's political institutions meets these requirements. Two, as I suggested in passing,the constitution and institutions have to have some very basic level of acceptance. Take for example the US: there is lots of dissatisfaction with the government, the laws and the constitution, and for good reason - but people basically go along with what the government decrees. Democratic or more broadly speaking political legitimacy can't be merely electoral or formal. In my view there isn't enough popular acceptance of state institutions right now to give these institutions legitimate authority. Three, electoral legitimacy requires that the electoral framework itself has some vague claim to legitimacy. An election of candidates is relatively straightforward: as long as people can run and there's not too much cheating, their election has a reasonable degree of legitimacy. But the referendum of March 19 was a different matter. This offered the take-it-or-leave-it choice so typical of military dictatorships - the generals thoughtfully offer their proposal and the general public hasn't the slightest opportunity to offer anything else, much less participate in its formulation. That has nothing to do with a constitution adopted through popular sovereignty: such constitutions come out of popular assemblies, not army headquarters! You can say that the vote was an expression of popular will, but approval by referendum in such circumstances has never, to my knowledge, been considered to confer democratic legitimacy.
So, finally, I do agree that Morsi's claim to democratic legitimacy is assailable, and that democratic legitimacy in the narrow sense is not the whole story. But I'm not offering a blanket defense of Morsi. I'm opposing legalistic and theoretical claims that Morsi violated the rule of law by arguing that there's no rule of law to violate. I believe your points do offer support for a case against Morsi, but not the case I judged inadequate
many democracies run on bare majorities for a long time.
ReplyDeleteI can't think of any stable government that runs on bare majorities for a long time. Once a substantial percentage of the population comes to believe that their government is indifferent to their wishes they will push for a change of government. That’s regardless of whether the government is democratic or not. Succession movements in Europe and in your own country and Europe are excellent examples of that. And those movements were handled by adopting anti-majoritarian positions so as to accommodate minorities.
That's where I was disagreeing that Morsi's situation was unique to it being prestate. If 40+% of the population doesn't want to live in an Islamic state what's going on now is pretty much the best it is ever going to get. Once the shine of the revolution wears off people are going to feel much more free to oppose the government. Once Morsi picks his foreign friends, and thus also picks his foreign enemies there are going to be states that aren't courting the Muslim Brotherhood but rather are courting the opposition. If he has huge chunks of the population that hate his government, the best he can hope for under those conditions is Lebanon. And given the strategic importance of Egypt I’d say he’d be lucky if he gets that. If he has huge chunks of the population that mostly agree with him, think he tries to be fair to them, even though they would prefer different leadership, then he can have Canada.
That’s why democracies don’t have bare majoritarianism. Actual democracy don’t say that if you happen to be in the 45% group and not the 55% group your wishes for how you want to live are irrelevant. Which means creating protections and creating a system which requires compromise. Your government has this why shouldn’t Egypt’s? Creating a system which checks and balances as well as requirements for super majorities to achieve most major objectives forces politicians to negotiate with and compromise with the other side. The 55% may have 70% of the power but they don't have 100% of the power.
If secularists want something else they have to start delivering something to the people rather than fighting a crucial purge of the old-régime bureaucracy.
ReplyDeleteWhat they are doing is what people do in a democracy. They are forming a functioning opposition party. Opposition parties are frequently a coalition who hate the majoritarian party for a variety of reasons, sometimes even conflicting reasons. As the majority party alienates more subgroups the opposition party can grow their coalition. The danger is that while they can form a majority they have trouble governing because of deep disagreements on crucial matters of policy.
To pick an example the USA Republican party was able to shift America from a center-left coalition to a center-right coalition by unifying 8 groups that on the surface had little in common: pro-life activists, pro-gun activists, anti-tax, people with an eschatological foreign policy, anti-public education forces.... None of those policies had close to majority support 30 years ago, most still don't, but they are unquestionably a strong coalition. Going further back in time the Democratic party 1865-1932 was this sort of coalition: mixing urban Catholics who didn’t use banks, and deeply rural farmers in favor of silver banking.
That's healthy behavior for a democracy. It prevents the government from adopting policies that while somewhat popular with a majority are despised by huge chunks of the population. This is one of the crucial methods for avoiding majoritarianism. The Egyptian secularists have no reason to be embarrassed about forming a political coalition, an opposition party of those disgruntled by MB rule. And of course they should be protecting the members of the bureaucracy that are loyal to other members of their coalition. Doing that sort of thing is how after 20 years later most anti-abortionists now want lower taxes and how 20 years later the anti-tax crowd is now strongly pro-life. By being loyal to one another’s causes they form a tight coalition not a loose coalition. Morsi is using extraordinary powers to suppress the formation of opposition parties, it is hard to see that as anything other than a dictatorship, though a dictatorship with popular support.
Finally: Copts are part of the people of Egypt. Secularists are part of the people of Egypt. People who objected to the revolution and though Mubarak was doing a good job, are part of the people of Egypt. The people of Egypt are not all Islamist. Anyone who is building a government that excludes that huge chunks of the population, isn't representing the people, he is just the factional leader of the largest faction. Winning the election in a democracy means a transitioning from the head of a political party to the head of State. Morsi, by virtue of having won, no longer has the right to represent the Muslim Brotherhood, he has to represent all Egyptians including those who disagree with the Muslim Brotherhood. Now certainly he gets to implement his program but he needs to implement his program in a way that unites the country not divides it. If he unable or unwilling to represent all Egyptians, then people have every right to be highly critical of him and I don't see any reason for progressive forces to refrain from being critical.
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Finally when it comes to progressives, and majoritarianism there are two possible definitions.
ReplyDelete1) There is the classic definition those who believe in a strong executive with a weak legislature and judiciary to create democratic accountability. In other words the definition that includes both Woodrow Wilson and Dick Cheney. Absolutely that form of being progressive is majoritarian.
2) On the other hand there is the use of "progressive" as a synonym for liberal in the modern sense. And I don't believe that bare majoritarianism was ever a progressive virtue. Miscegenation laws had about 80% support when progressives worked to overturn them. 25 years ago the numbers were about the same on gay marriage. I'd say progressives are anti-majoritarian, their entire philosophy is to try and support unpopular minorities against powerful interests, powerful interests that even in nominal democracies often have majority support.
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Good talking to you.
Thanks for your comments; please forgive a very brief, superficial reply. I welcome your remark that a population can and will push for change even outside a democracy. As for governmental stability, a bare majority is a lot better than the bare pluralities we so often encounter. Also, you can have the modest governmental instability of bare majorities/pluralities, yet have considerable social stability. Canada, as you know, offers examples of this.
DeleteI heartily agree that majority rule is not the be-all and end-all; Mill's case for civil liberties was explicitly anti-majoritarian, i.e., anti-democratic. My point is that a bare majority, whatever its power to legitimate, is the only sort of legitimacy available in Egypt right now, and Morsi has it. Normal political legitimation processes can operate only when there is a constitution and a state. I believe the left/liberals would be in the strongest ideological position if they let Morsi establish a state and then contested his policies - indeed, if circumstances warrant, his legitimacy. This isn't an attempt to tell the left/liberals what strategy to adopt, only to remark on what makes most ideological sense.
Excellent post, and I agree with your comment above as well. I've been trying to argue along similar lines at various venues, such as Nathan Brown's post at The Arabist blog: http://www.arabist.net/blog/2012/11/25/decoder-morsi-the-judiciary-and-acts-of-sovereignty.html Aside from the fundamental constitutional issue, which seemingly few participants grasp at all, there is the problem that the left-liberals seem generally unable to admit the contradictions within their own vision of the post-revolutionary state.
ReplyDeleteThanks, and yes, the left-liberals, even real leftists have a problem. They just love democracy except when it happens. That's probably why they try to make the constitutional issue assume more weight than it can bear.
ReplyDeleteCK --
ReplyDeleteWhat is contradictory? The left-liberals want a democracy. A guy winning a 52-48 victory and then turning around stacking the constitutional drafting committee 85/15 with his supporters and trying to ram with through with no discussion from the other side is not democracy.
Just to pick my country for example.
The convention that drafted the constitution was appointed by 13 separate bodies.
The final tally of delegates who supported the draft was 38-3
For it to have force of law 9 out of the 13 states had to ratify (which often required 2/3rds of majorities within the states)
When 2 or 3 states raised issue 12 more amendments were proposed of which 10 passed (the bill of rights).
By the end 13 out of 13 states ratified.
That constitution has lasted till this day because it sought consensus.
Oh and any changes require 2/3rd of both houses and 3/4ths of the states to approve.
Constitutions needs very broad support to survive. That's the way democracy works. There is nothing wrong with "left-liberals" objecting to some guy who has very limited legitimacy undermining the revolution by acting like a dictator. Winning an election does not grant a leader dictatorial powers.
CD-Host, as you are likely well aware, there were numerous contradictions within, and divisions over, that constitution you describe, including some bases of disagreement that seemed to put the survival of the union continually in jeopardy. Needless to say, that's a long and complex discussion.
DeleteAs for constitutions needing very broad support, the proposition is somewhat tautological, since what it says essentially is that to constitute state power you need to constitute state power.
The integration of the state depends upon effective consensus, but that consensus can be as simple as the Hobbesian model: In the end, people will (and ought) to choose any sovereign power over disintegration. The mass democratic order with enumerated powers is one alternative. It may even be the best one available, even for Egypt, but it must be adjusted for local conditions, which in Egypt appear more favorable to Islamist than primarily Western liberal concepts, though even the production of a written constitution articulated in terms of popular sovereignty is arguably an uncredited compromise between Islamic and Western concepts.
The American model cannot be entirely separated from its own unique historical moment and its origins in Protestant rationalism. Prior to an achieved reconciliation of the two worldviews, a consensus based on one must displace the other, and a decision between the two will at some level be coercive, with each side blaming the other for a resort to force.
As for constitutions needing very broad support, the proposition is somewhat tautological, since what it says essentially is that to constitute state power you need to constitute state power.
DeleteNo what it says that it is essentially to form permanent bonds of state power you need a strong consensus at a point in time. A constitution represents not a set of policies but a program for how policy is achieved.
The integration of the state depends upon effective consensus, but that consensus can be as simple as the Hobbesian model: In the end, people will (and ought) to choose any sovereign power over disintegration.
I'm not sure they should. I'd rather say that integration or disintegration into smaller groups is a pragmatic choice that people make so as to achieve objectives. The reason we don't have one world government is that the cultural differences are too wide and thus the costs of integration outweigh the costs of disintegration. On the other hand, broad economic confederacies like the European Union are a step towards more integration.
That being said, a constitution designed to be permanent is not the first step in achieving state power. For example in the US the colonies had existed for over a century, and the USA had a confederation of the now independent colonies for 9 years before the constitution was drafted and ratified by all 13 states.
I'm not saying drafting a constitution early is a mistake, what I am saying is that it is not a necessary precondition for a state. Egyptian society seems to have agencies that function without a constitution today. Maybe something much weaker like a legislature and rules of order might make a better first step.
Prior to an achieved reconciliation of the two worldviews, a consensus based on one must displace the other,
That's not a constitution. That's my point, I'm saying the exact opposite. Prior to an achieved reconciliation the constitution must reflect both views, protect both views, and setup mechanisms for reconciling contradictions between both views.
Just to use the US example again. There were disagreements whether the United States was a union of people's or a union of states. So our legislature in the constitution (until amended) is structured where one house is elected by popular vote based on population (more or less); and the other is elected by state legislatures without popular input. Both views were represented and by creating a situation where neither chamber could do much on its own, a consensus between those sorts of irreconcilable views was achieved.
Writing a constitution is all about those sorts of compromises. Replacement may take a very long time, it took almost 150 years till people felt comfortable granting the national government the authority to apply non-uniform taxes. Replacement might never happen, we still have those 2 chambers in more or less the same structure.
The left/liberals do not have any obligation what-so-ever not to fight for their interests and values when it comes to the constitution. Liberalism is not a suicide pact. Block vote the Islamist constitution down and get a good one, without apology and without remorse.
These two particular worldviews are perceived to be mutually exclusive in regard to questions of primary importance to those who hold to them. If they are not reconciled philosophically to the satisfaction of both sides, then on those questions there can be no consensus.
DeleteThe question for the Egyptians is whether a consensus exists sufficient to the formation of a state, and what kind of state that consensus allows to form. Under the search for that consensus, what might qualify as true or sufficient "reflection" and "protection" of "both (world)views" is itself, apparently, a matter of dispute - and for some significant actors not even recognized as desirable. For example, many Western-oriented liberals as well as the members of minority religious groups would prefer no special recognition of Islam and Sharia Law or of any religion or religious tradition. The Salafists and Muslim Brothers strongly believe the opposite. The latter coalition also generally believes that the monotheistic religions deserve higher levels of recognition and rights than others deemed polytheistic or atheistic, and their draft constitution reflects this belief. They have views on women and the family that may be irreconcilable with the views of the liberals, and neither side accepts the terms offered by the other side.
These examples merely scratch the surface of fundamentally lacking ideological consensus. A polity lacking broad ideological consensus across all factions may discover a sufficient qualified consensus, for instance a super-majority that recognizes a special place for Islam and other matters, next to a very broad consensus that living under imposition of an unwanted national ideological apparatus, even 2nd or 3rd or worse class citizenship, with perhaps the potential of improving one's personal or communal predicament over time, is preferable to exclusion, expulsion, or death. Such a result would be in some respects tyrannical or at least authoritarian and illiberal, but the only alternative would appear to be a tyranny of the liberal minority, an unlikely political result especially given the revolutionary empowerment of the masses and the much higher level of organization and popular support enjoyed by the Islamists.
I don't think the situation is as unbalanced in terms of majority / minority. I think the we have two coalitions both in the 40-60% range: leftists, Nasrists, socialists, communists, Christians, liberals vs. Islamist. That's not a one party state that is a two party state. I think both election results in 2011 and 2012 show that Islamists are not the majority.
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Most of what you listed here are policy differences. Parties are supposed to differ on policy that doesn't mean compromises aren't possible.
For example, many Western-oriented liberals as well as the members of minority religious groups would prefer no special recognition of Islam and Sharia Law or of any religion or religious tradition. The Salafists and Muslim Brothers strongly believe the opposite.
Right and you can compromise this a bunch of way:
a) Create pluralism where you have multiple "denominations" of mosques which have legal power on social issues but the population has the right to freely associate with whichever one they want. So if you belong to the conservative church and commit adultery you get executed, whipped or ... On the other hand if you belong to the liberal one no one cares. This is the sort of thing that existed in religious colonies where we had pluralism and religious law.
b) Don't have the constitution take any position on the basis of laws. And let each law be a one off. Overtime some laws are based on sharia and others are totally contrary to sharia.
c) Set up conflicting legal mechanisms. Setup a secular police force with discretion and a sharia court system. That way they check on each other.
d) Or you pick and choose from your list. Maybe everyone can live with Islam being privileged but not with sharia so Egypt has Islam getting state support and subsidy but secular criminal law.
I can think of 100 ways to solve these issues. They exist. What's important though is the principle that the Islamists need to compromise, they aren't going to get their constitution through. Any kind of coalition based system, which includes democracy works by coalitions that disagree on policy working out stuff. The Islamists want stuff, and they are going to get some of it and in exchange for that stuff they get they are going to have to settle for some stuff they really don't like.
This is the dialogue so far:
Islamists: We want X
Secular: We want Y
Islamists: Who cares what you want. The new constitution say X. Will you vote for it?
Secular: No.
Maybe the Islamist parties need to watch their constitution go down in flames before they realize they can't have 85 Islamists in the constitution drafting committee. There is nothing horrible about them losing a vote.
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A polity lacking broad ideological consensus across all factions may discover a sufficient qualified consensus, for instance a super-majority that recognizes a special place for Islam and other matters, next to a very broad consensus that living under imposition of an unwanted national ideological apparatus, even 2nd or 3rd or worse class citizenship, with perhaps the potential of improving one's personal or communal predicament over time, is preferable to exclusion, expulsion, or death.
How is that compromise. That's just giving the Islamists what they want. If there was a super majority for that then it wouldn't matter what liberals thought. The problem for Morsi is that there is a super majority for that, they may not even be a simple majority for that. What you are urging liberals to do is give Morsi his majority in exchange for nothing because of some unnamed Liberal principe which causes them to back bad policies.
Let me ask you a simple question. When George W Bush (a conservative) was president and wanted funds to more or less permanently occupy Iraq, Nancy Pelosi (a liberal) turned him down. Did she do the wrong thing? Since when are liberals obligated to give conservatives what they want?
You're not getting it: Your view of "compromise" is the Islamist definition of capitulation, and the reverse is true for the liberals.
DeleteI didn't describe the worse (but not worst) case scenario as a "compromise." I described it as a possibly actually available consensus.
I believe you are making a mistake to compare the Egyptian problem to conventional American political decisions. An American "conservative" is in the political philosophical sense still within the horizon of secular liberalism. The word "liberal" means something very different in the broad confrontation with authentic theocrats than it does in the confrontation between W and Pelosi. It is more like trying to work out a compromise when a majority of the country is to the right of the furthest right Tea Partiers, and another significant faction is just barely to their left. You're arguing for what is apparently the view of an actual small minority of Egyptians.
Regardless of numbers, it is akin to the difference between American revolutionaries and loyalists, or North and South in the mid-19th C, only even more extreme in key respects. The conflict re-produces if obviously in less violent form and within a shared national-cultural space the "Clash of Civilizations," a basis of open warfare for centuries, including at times in this century. It is not the same as any of these conflicts. It is sui generis. It is, as they say, what it is and nothing else. That it is not, to the point, open to comprehensive consensual settlement is the beginning point of this entire discussion.
As Prof. Neumann has explained in his post, the actual constitution of the state, which would not necessarily be the same even as the agreement on a written constitution, is being contested. The conflict over the written constitution expresses it clearly: It is the palpable result and clearest evidence of the fact. The liberal position as you express it is "let's instead pretend we agree on this consensus which happens to equate with our minority view of what the state should be."
Whether or not it's 60-40 or, as in the recent electoral rounds, a majority of Islamists, a large minority of conservative non-Islamist Muslims, and a small but loud minority of cosmopolitan liberals and religious minorities, neither is a formula for consensus on a Western liberal ordering and concept of the nation-state. The reason we know this is that nothing remotely like such a consensus has been formed.
Hi CK.
DeleteYour view of "compromise" is the Islamist definition of capitulation, and the reverse is true for the liberals.
That's the usual case in a democracy for at least one set of extremes. And the really cool thing that democracy does is cause the side that is most inflexible to lose and thus get a result far worse than they could have gotten through compromise. What happens is exactly what I've said.
Morsi loses the 50% required to pass the constitution.
The popularity of the Islamist goes down since they are seen as just as bad as the Mubarak group in terms of being anti-democratic while at the same time ineffectual.
Assume you are right, that he doesn't capitulate
Ahmed Shafik got 48.3% in the runoff. Which means he likely today could win a majority.
He doesn't make the same mistake gets strong support from non Islamic groups and wins 60% of the vote for the presidency.
And he passes a constitution with that all the other parties like. Al-Nour and F&J instead of getting 70% of the loaf get 10% of the loaf. And as long as they are happy with those kind of outcomes they can feel great that they don't capitulate. But that generally happens pretty fast. Compete defeat makes compromise appealing.
As for this not working with right wing crazies. Need I mention this form of government was invented for the Massachusetts colony with regular witch burnings, children taken from their parents for years for rudeness, slavery... and it worked to moderate them out.
Whether or not it's 60-40 or, as in the recent electoral rounds, a majority of Islamists, a large minority of conservative non-Islamist Muslims, and a small but loud minority of cosmopolitan liberals and religious minorities, neither is a formula for consensus on a Western liberal ordering and concept of the nation-state. The reason we know this is that nothing remotely like such a consensus has been formed.
If the Islamists have 70% of the vote than what the secularists do doesn't matter. Left / Liberals can take whatever moral stand they want because their practical impact is 0. And the whole point of the post is moot in that case. But I see an electorate that by 2012
Mohamed Morsi (islamists) 24.78%
Ahmed Shafik (secular) 23.66%
Hamdeen Sabahi (leftists) 20.72%
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh (islamists) 17.47%
Amr Moussa (secular) 11.13%
that ain't a islamists only electorate. I've been reading Al-Ahram since the late 1990s, which was sort of a party paper. It seems to me Egyptians, at least Mubarak followers understand Western liberal norms, the paper was loaded with these norms.
numbers, it is akin to the difference between American revolutionaries and loyalists, or North and South in the mid-19th C,
The way the revolutionaries built their consensus was through the democratic process. The way South was reintegrated after the war was through painful compromises.
Ultimately if there are huge number of Egyptians that just want a totally different society, Egypt can:
a) Pick a dictator and have lots of unhappy people or
b) Compromise or
c) Break into multiple countries.
Those are the options. If things really are that irreconcilable then a partition of Egypt not a constitution is what is needed. But I am much more hopeful, and I'm more hopeful because all Egyptians seem to consider themselves part of one nation. And being one nation means they hold to common ideals. And those ideals held in common, and only those ideals are what belong in the constitution.
They also despise all expressions of faith, except their own, which, according to their stubbornly held, unquestionable dogma, is not a faith at all.
ReplyDeleteA few critics of Morsi and of the Muslim Brotherhood will confess, at moments of despair, that effective dominance by the Islamist coalition may be a representative expression of Egyptian popular self-determination at this historical-cultural moment, but, perhaps understandably if not very constructively, with few exceptions they resist the logical conclusions regarding their own prospects. Instead of seeking a modus vivendi with those best positioned to form the state, like the true believers they are they insist on their own divisive, pseudo-universalist vision.
My point is that a bare majority, whatever its power to legitimate, is the only sort of legitimacy available in Egypt right now, and Morsi has it.
ReplyDeleteI don't agree that is the only sort of legitimacy available. I think Morsi has the option of trying to create an Egyptian consensus and Egyptian law. There is no reason that constitutional committee should have been 85% MB instead of 40%. Morsi should be going out of his way to make sure that leftists, Nasrists, socialists, communists, Christians, liberals are over represented in the constitutional committee because those the groups who being in the minority are mostly likely to break away from the process all together and look for means outside the democracy to protect their interests. Morsi's job as president of Egypt is to keep them engaged, by making sure that they see democracy as a viable option. There is absolutely nothing preventing Morsi from making a legitimacy that does well beyond a bare majority, and a bare majority that I'm not sure he still even possesses.
. I believe the left/liberals would be in the strongest ideological position if they let Morsi establish a state and then contested his policies - indeed, if circumstances warrant, his legitimacy. This isn't an attempt to tell the left/liberals what strategy to adopt, only to remark on what makes most ideological sense.
How does that make idealogical sense? Seriously I don't see your chain of reasoning at all How is it consistent with left/liberal objectives to allow an Islamist to semi-permanently entrench anti left/liberal policies in a constitution in exchange for as far as I can tell, nothing? What makes sense for left/liberals ideologically is to advance liberal / left policies through democratic means. And that option is available to them and makes sense strategically. That means acting a minority faction capable of casting deciding votes and selling their vote, and selling it for a lot.
Make it crystal clear to Morsi that an Islamist constitution gets voted down 60/40 in the popular referendum because they are going to organize and vote against it. That at the current time they are siding with the Mubarak faction but for the right consensus they are perfect happy to join with the MB faction on this vote. But never in a permanent way. It is in their long term interests that Morsi and the Islamicist never fully consolidate power, and they should be quite open about that. There is nothing wrong with playing a bad hand in the best way possible.
Why would they ever want to allow Morsi to make a bad situation worse that they could compete in a game rigged against them? How is that ideologically consistent in any way? If they believe in democracy then they have an obligation to act like a democratic faction. If they believe in left/liberal polices then they have an obligation to use those legitimate means available to them to advance those policies. This is is one of the lucky times in life when both moral goods point to the same set of actions.
Can't keep up with all this, so just three brief comments.
ReplyDeleteFirst, by 'the only source of legitimacy available' I meant 'the only source that current realities offer'. There is no chance at all, at this point, of a consensus even within the secularists, let alone between the secularists and the Islamists. So consensus-based legitimacy isn't an option.
Second, democratically elected rulers are under no obligation to infuse everything they do or try to do with democratic procedure. Typically, a democratically elected official is obliged to act in what he judges to be in the best interests of the electorate, not to do what is in the best interests of democracy. So Morsi's machinations, however unrepresentative, aren't a violation of his mandate.
Third, by 'strongest ideological position' I mean 'the position most consistent with liberal principles', not the position most likely to further liberal objectives. The current position is weak because it comprises falsehoods, namely (as I argued) that Morsi has violated the rule of law and assumed dictatorial powers. But if we're talking about objectives, the left/liberals cannot allow or not allow anything to be entrenched in the constitution. They haven't the power and that ship has sailed. They have no choice but either (1) to fight for constitutional amendments and changes later or possibly (2) to derail the whole process, most likely by bringing back much of the old régime. Not sure how (2) would further liberal objectives.
(part 1)
DeleteFirst, by 'the only source of legitimacy available' I meant 'the only source that current realities offer'. There is no chance at all, at this point, of a consensus even within the secularists, let alone between the secularists and the Islamists. So consensus-based legitimacy isn't an option.
I don't agree. I think there is a lot of agreement between Egyptians. I can imagine all sorts of compromises. For example take criminal law. Assume you have policy that: criminal law is passed by F&J, judges come from Al-Nour, police and corrections come from New World. That ensures a consensus criminal justice system with checks and balances. Also everyone agrees that Al-Nour are less likely to be bribed.
Those are the sorts of policies that the Egyptians will need to come up with, once Morsi realizes he is president of Egypt not president of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Second, democratically elected rulers are under no obligation to infuse everything they do or try to do with democratic procedure. Typically, a democratically elected official is obliged to act in what he judges to be in the best interests of the electorate, not to do what is in the best interests of democracy. So Morsi's machinations, however unrepresentative, aren't a violation of his mandate.
Pragmatically the reason democratic leaders want consensus in the early stages is to avoid a situation where they go to the trouble of drafting a bill and it dies on the floor. So in this case, Morsi in having built a constitution which is unpalatable should see it die in the referendum. And that's how he learns to exercise more democratic procedure earlier in the process.
I think it is a great thing for Left / Liberals to make it clear to the MB that their policy going forward is any bill that they aren't heavily involved in the drafting of, they vote against unread. Their automatic answer to "take it or leave it" is leave it, all the time, every-time.
What I don't understand though is why you believe that Morsi is entitled to act in minimally democratic ways as head of state but the leftists / liberals have an obligation to act in maximally democratic ways as bit players in the opposition. I'd assume just the opposite. Winning the election means you have non-partisan obligations, losing an election allows you to be partisan and slowly build a coalition for the next government.
(part 2)
DeleteI mean 'the position most consistent with liberal principles', not the position most likely to further liberal objectives.
I understand that. I'm hard pressed to see what liberal principle requires them to back and not oppose an Islamic takeover of Egypt.
The current position is weak because it comprises falsehoods, namely (as I argued) that Morsi has violated the rule of law and assumed dictatorial powers.
That's called spin. Spinning is part of being part of a democracy. Their job as the opposition is to undermine support for the majority party so as to win later elections. They are playing their role which is to help rally the public against Morsi and his constitution. Conversely if Morsi had invited them to the table they would be rallying the public to support Mosi's constitution. If Morsi wants public support then he needs to bring them onboard. Like I said above, it is their job to make it in Morsi's interest that they are in the tent pissing out, not outside the tent pissing in. There is nothing inconsistent with Liberal policies in pressuring Morsi.
Do you think Bob Rae is being maximally generous every time he says mean things about Stephen Harper?
(part 3)
DeleteBut if we're talking about objectives, the left/liberals cannot allow or not allow anything to be entrenched in the constitution. They haven't the power and that ship has sailed. They have no choice but either (1) to fight for constitutional amendments and changes later or possibly (2) to derail the whole process, most likely by bringing back much of the old régime. Not sure how (2) would further liberal objectives.
Voting down a bill is not derailing it is the process. That is the process. The governing authority proposes a bill, forces it to the floor and the opposition organizes the vote to help it fail. That's like saying that turning down a bid is derailing a negotiation. "No" is as much a part of negotiation as "yes".
As for how Morsi's constitution failing would further liberal objectives. What I said.
a) It might change Morsi's behavior either before or after the vote and thus result in a more liberal constitution. That's a huge accomplishment something that outweighs almost anything else.
a1) Even if the vote is successful, which I don't think it will be, it creates the later possibility of disowning the constitution as Islamist but not Egyptian. The constitution becomes a one party document and thus lacks any moral authority. That lack of moral authority prevents the Islamists from consolidating power. Preventing Morsi from consolidating power is a liberal objective.
b) It would establish the liberal's willingness to oppose the Islamists and side with old regime on a purely pragmatic basis. It allows the Liberal / Left to cast themselves in the deciding vote anytime the Old-Regime objectives conflict with the majoritarian Islamist party. That's a powerful position from which they can achieve policy objectives.
c) Even if the result of their actions is to partially bring the old-regime back into power that might be to their advantage. I suspect the Mubarak types would be happy to have the ability to control the countries wealth in exchange for substantially social policy concessions to secularists and Copts. That's a good trade. As I've said before a coalition of: leftists, Nasrists, socialists, communists, Christians, liberals strikes me as an excellent non-Islamic opposition party. It is entirely possible they will have to spend a generation working with the old-regime in the same party.
d) It establishes the basic democratic norms. Morsi can propose legislation, it goes down in flames and nothing much happens. He just steps up to the plate and tries again this time making more concessions. In a functional democracy leaders lose votes regularly. I think everyone watching the President of Egypt not getting his way on something important is a really really valuable moment for Egypt that they have a democracy and not a dictatorship. That's a wonderful moment for a country which is used to the leader's word being law. Frankly I can think of nothing better for Egypt in terms of democratic norms than Morsi being a weak executive and committee chairs in the legislature were mostly running the country. Especially if some of those committee chairs are liberals or Copts and thus the idea of one party rule is put to rest.
Briefly.
DeleteAs I keep saying, there is no governing authority, no established process, no realistic prospect of 'voting down' anything. The only way of stopping the constitution is to create even more instability by somehow messing up, outside safe, prescribed procedures, attempts to legitimate it.
And on the election: The old gambit of adding up results in the first election round, popular among Egyptian secularists, accomplishes nothing. What matters from the standpoint of democratic legitimacy is that when it came down to a choice between Morsi and a secularist, a majority picked Morsi. Sure, some of those Morsi votes were strategic. The strategic voters were
secularists who didn't like Morsi but liked the secularist alternative even less. So what? How does that make Morsi any less legitimate? What matters is that you get the most votes, not why people voted for you. And why is it never supposed that there were strategic votes of another sort for Shafiq? Most of the Shafiq voters were certainly Muslim but preferred the old régime for one reason or another: they thought Morsi was too radical socially, or were Islamists disillusioned with the Brotherhood, or were worried that Morsi would alienate the West and ruin the economy. Or maybe not. The speculation far outruns the evidence, which is exactly why democratic legitimacy can't be undermined by claims about how people might have voted but didn't.
Morsi didn't come in as a dictator and he hasn't the power to do (as opposed to say) anything dictatorial at this point. It's quite possible that he will act according to the constitution and the will of parliament when there *is* a parliament. That's a real possibility because, to repeat, most people voted for him, and future votes may endorse the constitution, an Islamist parliament, and his presidency. So it's very early indeed to identify Morsi's rule, now or in the future, as 'dictatorship'.
no established process, no realistic prospect of 'voting down' anything.
DeleteWell first off there is an established procedure and a realistic prospect. There is a popular referendum after Morsi proposes the constitution before the constitution has any effect. If Morsi refuses to pull this draft himself, which seems likely then secularist politicians come out strongly against the constitution, which and vote him down. And that's precisely what they seem to be doing. Creating negative PR around both the constitution and Morsi's process and thus making him more likely to lose the referendum.
How does that make Morsi any less legitimate?
Morsi is the legitimate president. Legitimate presidents can engage in dictatorial actions. When Dick Cheney had people tortured so that they would feed false information to congress about an Al-Quida / Ba'ath connectio he was engaging in dictatorial actions even though he was the fully legitimately elected Vice President of the United States. Dick Cheney was illegitimate his action were.
a) Morsi had no right to convene a constitutional convention that was narrow. It should have been either a purely part caucus (i.e. F&J only) or broad. A constitution needs to represent a broad consensus of society and is illegitimate when authored narrowly. Morsi does not have the right to construct a constitutional committee under whatever rules he wants. Finally constitutional conventions are functions of the society not functions of the president. Barack Obama and I have precisely the same level of authority when it comes to the constitution. Morsi shouldn't even be involved.
b) When a party head uses the power of the state to advance the interests of his party over the interests of the society the judiciary is empowered to step in. Morsi in trying to create a biased and fake constitutional authoring group was committing a non democratic act, which the judiciary rightfully rejected. Morsi's claim that his acts are not subject to judicial review is dictatorial.
c) It is certainly appropriate for those groups that lost the election to urge the population that respects their opinion to vote the constitution down. And that's really what's happening at this point. The opposition is making a strong case for a no vote on the referendum.
Now it may be that Morsi at some point in the future agrees to start like a democratic leader and not a dictator, but right now what he is doing is taking what should be a pillar that the society will be able to attach to in many battles to come and making it a hastily written partisan document.
It's quite possible that he will act according to the constitution and the will of parliament when there *is* a parliament.
DeleteHe might. And that's a different situation. The constitution does hit the reset button to some extent. On top of how he arrived at the constitution, the constitution he is proposing is dreadful.
If Morsi does have the votes, a dictatorial Islamists state might be preferable, because it would lack legitimacy and thus would be prone to a higher degree of internal subversion to a democratic one. But I don't think Morsi does.
Yes the goal of the Left/Secularists is to avoid dictatorship, the goal is also to avoid an islamic state. Scylla and Charybdis. Left / Liberals should aim to try and avoid both. They have to kill this constitution and then see where Morsi wants to go.
That's a real possibility because, to repeat, most people voted for him, and future votes may endorse the constitution, an Islamist parliament, and his presidency.
I agree that might happen. And if it does, if the Islamists hold a permanent sustained majority then game over the secularists lose. Egypt has a terrible government which is going to be able to achieve popular legitimacy is will be able to consolidate power. Either the Liberal Left can stop this or not. If they can't stop it then what are you worried about? If they can stop it, then they are doing the right thing in making Morsi much more likely to lose the referendum.
We've been talking about the referendum and the constitution. We now have some facts. Referendum is scheduled for Dec 15th. Constitution is more crafty than many suspected it would be given the composition of the committee. It essentially introduces contradictory articles to both make and not make drastic change. There are rights specified but almost all of them are heavily undercut by other clauses. So homes are cannot be searched, except as specified by law. Everyone has freedom to practice religion, as regulated. It prohibits insults to persons which could turn into a very strong anti-free speech clause.
ReplyDeleteStreet reaction has been negative but without polling it is hard to figure out what that means. Hopefully people see through this, as a document which offers essentially no rights at all. BBC published a side by side comparison with the old constitution.