Sometimes
the defeats of the 'Arab Spring' revolutions are blamed on 'lack of unity'. Little serious attention is devoted to just
why unity is lacking. All too often the
problem involves no mere disposition to fractiousness but a tragic inability to make hard choices. What's
more, the worse things get, the harder it becomes to acknowledge even that
there's a hard choice to be made. That
failure to choose can breed elaborate self-deception and wishful thinking.
In
Syria the hard choice is between radical Islamists and Assad. The reality is stark. The US, in a perpetual panic about arms
falling into Islamist hands, was never inclined to give serious aid to an
anti-Assad revolution. When IS routed
the American/Iranian proxy forces in Iraq, this disinclination solidified into
certainty. Syria's rebels would be aided
only against IS. US plans for the rebels
complement its air campaign strategy, which US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel
explicitly said would help Assad. The US have moved from not intending to
overthrow Assad to intending not to overthrow him.
The
US betrayal of Syrian rebels left radical Islamists as the only real
alternative to those genuinely committed to destroying the régime. Secularist forces clearly would not, on
their own, be up to the job; indeed their very survival is questionable. (Here
is an only slightly too pessimistic overview of the military situation.)
The only way to beat Assad is to ally with radical Islamists and
especially Jabhat al Nusra, whose forces were in many areas by far the most
effective.
For
secularists the choice is hard for three reasons. First, while Jabhat al Nusra professes no
desire to impose its views on others, it
has an ultraconservative agenda. If
dominant, it would establish a state which rejected all liberal ideals and
imposed draconian restrictions, most of all on women and minorities. It would transform Syria into a society which
secularists found unlivable. Second,
and worse, quite possibly a majority of Syrians have much the same
inclinations. Third, by now US attacks
on radical Islamists have provoked increasingly bitter FSA-Jabhat-al-Nusra fighting
in which some secular activists have lost friends and relatives. For many secularists, an alliance with Jabhat
al Nusra is an abomination promising an abhorrent future.
The
alternative, the only other alternative, is Assad. It is very unlikely that even an alliance
with Jabhat al Nusra could destroy the régime; it is utterly out of the
question that the secularists alone could do so. Allying with IS is also out of the
question because (unlike in Iraq) IS prefers attacking the secularists to allying
with them. So an alliance with radical
Islamists, in the form of JAN, is the only live option. To reject it is to facilitate the survival of
Assad. No 'being against', no
detestation of Assad can mask that reality.
The rejection entails the survival.
Indeed the secularists' alignment with the US now discredits them so thoroughly
that they can at most hope for a minor role in Syria's future. There is no nicely sanitized,
Western-democratic third way.
Secular
activists who reject Jabhat al Nusra have therefore in effect chosen
Assad. In their convictions they're as
anti-Assad as ever. Yet it's easy to see
signs, not even of 'cognitive dissonance', but of their true if very unwilling
allegiance.
I
will not point to individuals who exemplify this stance for two reasons. First, it would be deplorable to criticize
people whose desperation and personal loss have led them down what can only be
described as the wrong path. Second, few
individuals espouse all or exactly the views discussed: it is more a composite tendency than one
found in particular activists. But those
interested won't have trouble finding relevant examples. In what follows, "the activists"
just refers to some who share some of the attitudes described.
It
shows in several ways. They insist that
the US is backing "the rebels" after all. One alleged piece of evidence for this
fantasy predominates: don't the Americans provide the opposition fighting Assad
with "advanced" TOW anti-tank guided missiles? These missiles are not advanced; they have
been replaced in contemporary armies by more modern versions or by different systems altogether.* But the qualitative issues weigh less heavily
than the quantitative ones.
Here's
what it looks like when the US or, as the activists now obediently say,
"the Coalition", seriously backs a fighting force that it wants to win:
“The cargo plane contains 5,000 anti-tank
missiles to help the Peshmerga forces in the fight against IS militants,” a
Czech military official told Czech media.
"Earlier this year, the Czech
government approved the delivery of 10 million rounds of ammunition for
Kalashnikov assault rifles, eight million rounds for machine guns, 5,000 for
rocket-propelled grenades and 5,000 hand grenades for Kurdish fighters."
Of
course that's not the sole large arms delivery, nor are arms
deliveries the half of it. In days,
"the Coalition" somehow managed to provide the Kurds with substantial
air cover in the form of strikes coordinated with Kurdish fighters on the
ground. It is perhaps no coincidence that the Kurds'
relationship to Assad has been described as a "de facto alliance".
Kurdish
leaders say said that the support they receive is inadequate. If so, there are no words for the level of
supply to anti-Assad rebels, who still sometimes have to fight with improvised trebuchets,
and this after four years.
The
TOW missiles are a case in point. They
are supplied to 'vetted' rebel groups with the caution better suited to feeding
a cage full of rats. Each firing of
each TOW missile has to be recorded on video.
Here's what (according to meticulous arms tracker Elliott Higgins) the
tally looks like in recent months:
April 9
May
16
June
16
July
37
August 35
September 44
October 58
November 26
This
is America's bounty for the rebels. The
supplies are not for a force whose opponents, like IS, have no air cover and
who are being bombed daily with genuinely advanced precision munitions on the
basis of a state-of-the-art military intelligence system. No, these supplies are for a force
confronting the Syrian régime, an enemy with far more fighters than IS plus an
air force that inflicts devastating damage on rebels and civilians daily.
The
rebels' reaction to this situation has in some cases moved from indignation to apologetics
born, I think, of disgust and despair.
Activists
used to seethe with rage. Now they excuse
the Obama administration with fictions and absurdities. The US, it's said, 'has its own agenda' -
which you might as well say of Assad - and after all, the US is fighting the
rebels' enemy, "the Islamists".
Jabhat al Nusra now becomes "Al Qaeda", even though security
specialists say that "Al Qaeda" is more a brand than an organization, even though it's well known that many
joined Jabhat al Nusra simply because it was the best or only anti-Assad force in their region,
even though Jabhat al Nusra hasn't given the slightest indication they're new
Bin Ladens, even though their aggression against the US-aligned opposition comes
after the US bombed them. (Before that there were only the minor feuds common
throughout the Syrian conflict.) Syrian
activists cover their choice of Assad with the sort of willful or feigned
ignorance associated with the worst American bigots.
To
this nonsense they add a falsehood now so thoroughly exposed that it must count
as a lie: that IS and the régime are at
least de facto allies; that they "don't fight" one another. This represents a lame attempt to make
attacks on IS something like attacks on Assad.
The only problem is that even the US hasn't the gall to embrace such a
transparent excuse. It would be no more
absurd to say that, in the fight against IS, it is the rebels who are Assad's de
facto allies.
On
top of this, activists do what seems impossible; they look at the course of the
war through rose-colored glasses. Aleppo
is strangled, the clearest of indicators that the US isn't interested in
supporting the rebels against Assad - no matter, we're told that things aren't
going so badly after all. And then there
is the south, where the rebels, it seems, are eternally making decisive
gains. However it's quite clear that the
régime isn't serious about keeping the south and that the rebels haven't the
slightest chance of marching into Damascus from there. No, the war is not going well for the
rebels. The US knows and couldn't care
less.
Nor
is the US deeply concerned to hide its real agenda, which is to construct a
proxy force from scratch, entirely
devoted to fighting IS. (It would
therefore be simply wrong to call this force 'rebels'.) Its recruits are to be trained and vetted
with the utmost care. This leisurely
meticulousness shows an indifference to Syrians' agony that contrasts vividly
with the outraged attention devoted to the Yazidis, the Kurds, the Christians,
or indeed any minority not at war with Assad.
The
overall strategic picture fits suspiciously well with US objectives. The rebels are supplied with just enough to
keep Assad from wiping them out except possibly in Aleppo. One can only speculate on why this is allowed
to happen, but here's a guess. The US
wants both the régime and the rebels exhausted enough to come to some truce or
agreement, so that all their resources are turned against IS. Since the US has explicitly stated that its
attack on IS helps Assad and that it is not interested in overthrowing him by
force, the guess is hardly a wild one.
Not
long ago Syrians repeatedly said they fight alone. They still fight alone. America is not their friend or ally. As it fights one of their enemies, it
strengthens another with far more Syrian blood on its hands. What's more, the US' fight against IS is only
incidentally connected to the fate of Syria's revolutionaries. It will continue whether or not the rebels
survive and certainly whether or not activists become pro-US fanboys.
The
activists know this. Their embrace of
American treachery isn't about America, it's about their inability to choose
sides. Syria will remain Assad's torture
chamber or it will become an Islamist state repugnant to secularist
ideals. This is a hard choice but it is
also an obvious choice: the Islamist
state is far, far better than Assad. And
the embrace of illusions can only facilitate an Assadist victory.
-----
* Here's a rule of thumb. When referring to arms delivered to
non-Arabs, "advanced" and
"sophisticated" mean advanced
and sophisticated. When referring to
arms delivered to Arabs, they mean "obsolescent but still
serviceable".
Michael - My apologies for coming to this belatedly. I agree with much of what you say here about US intentions and policies . But I can't make much sense of assertions like "For many secularists, an alliance with Jabhat al Nusra is an abomination promising an abhorrent future." and even less of "Secular activists who reject Jabhat al Nusra have therefore in effect chosen Assad. " Your refusal to be more concrete about who you are referring to does not help. I can't think of any Syrian "activists" who would fall into this category. The US bombings of JaN and Ahrar ash-Sham were condemned across the political spectrum.
ReplyDeleteI also think you underestimate the dangers that arise from the prominent role that JaN plays in the armed opposition. Alliances with JaN - both tactical and strategic - may well be necessary, but that shouldn't obscure the fact that JaN dominance in a post-Asad world would indeed be an "abhorrent future" (or that there is also a significant downside to their contemporary role).